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Introduction
The Foundations of the Debate

In the early years of the American republic, legislators and government leaders attempted
to apply the vision of the Constitution. After Thomas Jefferson was elected President in the
“Revolution of 1801,” he promoted the construction of gunboats and harbor fortifications instead
of seagoing warships. “The gunboat itself,” wrote Jefferson, “is believed to be in use with every
modern maritime nation, for the purposes of defense.”1 While the gunboat program was
Jefferson’s, Congress was responsible for appropriations; consequentially, gunboats were a
frequent subject of debate during the Seventh through Tenth Congresses. Two Vermont
representatives demonstrated in microcosm the intense debate over the Jefferson’s gunboats;
Republican James Fisk supported Jefferson’s plan and stated, “[Gunboats] appeared to be
peculiarly adapted to the United States, who had a large extent of seacoast and numbers of
shoals, enabling them to act with effect.”2 Federalist James Elliot, also from Vermont, had a
different perspective. “Gunboats had been lately thought much of; what was the result?” he
asked his colleagues. “That gunboats might be considered as a kind of vessel guarding a little
deposit of national spirit, if any there was left to put on board! But as soon as they were assailed
by the wind or waves, their maiden purity was gone. They were of no use whenever there was
wind or tide, and could only float in a time of profound tranquility.”3
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1807,” American State Papers: Naval Affairs 60:163.
2
U.S. Congress, “Tuesday, February 5: National Defence,” in Annals of Congress, House of
Representatives, 9th Congress, 2nd session, 5 February, 1807 (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1851), 459.
3
Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 2nd sess., 5 February, 1807, 462.

3

To better understand why gunboats became an issue, some background is helpful. United
States politics quickly organized around two philosophies of government despite George
Washington’s warning, as he left office, of the divisive nature of political factions. Federalists,
such as Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, favored a powerful federal government, central banks,
and strong executive power. In contrast, the Republicans, including Thomas Jefferson, James
Madison, and James Monroe, favored weak central authority, state and individual rights, and, no
doubt influenced by their experience of the American Revolution with the tyranny of the British
Regulars, a weak national military. Therefore, President Jefferson committed to reducing the
size of the Army and planned to replace the large sea-going naval force begun by Presidents
Washington and Adams with lightly armed coastal defense gunboats manned by volunteer
militia.
A strong navy, then as now, protected a country’s coastline and commercial fleet and
projected power internationally. Most navies of Jefferson’s time were equipped with several
types of warship. The largest were called ships-of-the-line or battleships. Battleships were
large, sail-driven warships that mounted at least seventy-four guns in two or more gundecks and
fired projectiles that weighed eighteen to thirty-six pounds. HMS Victory, a veteran of the Battle
of Trafalgar preserved at Portsmouth, carried one hundred and four guns.4 While large navies
like the British Royal Navy or the French Navy owned many battleships, the majority of both
fleets were frigates, a smaller class of warship with only one gundeck. The U.S. Navy had a
small force of frigates, built during the Adams administration, and inherited by President
Jefferson. Frigates were armed with twenty to fifty guns, but most carried between twenty-eight
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and thirty-eight.5 The frigate USS Constitution, the oldest commissioned warship in the U.S.
Navy, was armed with forty-four cannon.
In contrast to large, heavily armed battleships and frigates, gunboats were small and
lightly armed. Most of the boats built by the Jefferson administration were forty-five to seventy
feet long and armed with one or two cannons. While rigged with masts and sails, gunboats could
also be rowed with oars by the crew. They were designed to operate in coastal water, and to
overwhelm larger warships by attacking from multiple directions in fleets. No floating examples
of Jeffersonian gunboats remain. However, archeological excavation of the sunken USS Allen, a
row galley gunboat which operated on Lake Champlain during the War of 1812, provides some
insight into their construction. In his doctoral thesis, Eric B. Emery wrote that the Allen was “a
hull design suited for operations in confined shoal waters,” and described a “double-ended” craft
“[measuring] 75 feet, 4 inches (22.9 m) in length …with a maximum breadth of 15 feet, 3 inches
(4.6 m).”6 The Allen was armed with a twenty-four pound cannon in the stern and an eighteenpound cannon in the bow, both mounted on sliding carriages in tracks.7
Unlike many defensive plans that are created and never used, Jefferson’s gunboats were
tested by actual use. Unfortunately, the War of 1812 found the gunboats and Republican defense
plans wanting. Gunboats were no match for the Royal Navy and were unable to prevent British
landings. The small U.S. regular forces were too few to stop the British Regulars, and the militia
was poorly trained and equipped. In contrast, the few frigates of U.S. Navy won incredible
victories against British frigates. Gunboats were abandoned after the War of 1812 in favor of a
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European-style navy of battleships and frigates. President Madison, with full Congressional
approval, ultimately decommissioned and sold the gunboats that remained.
This thesis will trace the Congressional debate that surrounded the implementation of
Jefferson’s gunboat program. Spelling and “gunboat” have been standardized, with modern
equivalents of words used; original spelling and “gun-boat” were retained in titles, and in a few
other cases. Chapter one examines the historiography of the gunboat program since Jefferson’s
administration and shows the evolution in historical thought concerning early Republican naval
appropriations. Chapter two considers Jefferson’s policies and attitudes regarding naval defense
and naval construction. While Congress is the primary focus of this thesis, Jefferson is a primary
supporting character, and was heavily involved in crafting legislation. Jefferson’s need to
appease Congressional Republican leaders, avoid antagonizing powerful international rivals, and
personal convictions left him with no other option for naval defense than gunboats and harbor
fortifications. After discussing the program’s beginning, chapter three outlines the
Congressional gunboat debates and focuses especially on the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Congresses. Jefferson proposed major expansions of the gunboat program and Congressional
debate reached its most acrimonious level between 1802 and 1808, and support for gunboats
came predominantly from northern Republicans, rather than traditional southern agrarians.
Chapter four discusses the final gunboat debate in the 10th Congress and examines the end of the
gunboat program following the War of 1812. Following their inability to defend the American
coast against the Royal Navy, President James Madison quietly and ingloriously retired gunboats
in favor of a European-style navy of battleships and frigates with strong support from
Congressional Republicans.
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Over the past two centuries, historians have largely reduced the naval appropriations
debates of the early-nineteenth century to a partisan affair between Republicans and Federalists,
and portrayed Jefferson and his fellow Republicans as universally anti-navy, southern, and
agriculturalists. The truth is more nuanced. Jefferson thought a large seagoing navy unnecessary
and needlessly expensive and believed gunboats not only the most republican and effective
option for coastal defense, but also a way to satisfy his political allies at home and not provoke
international rivals; in Congress, while the Republican caucus included anti-navy Southern
agrarians, northern Republicans dominated the gunboat debates and expressed a broad range of
opinions that included strongly pro-navy, Federalist beliefs.
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Chapter 1
Jeffersonian Ideals, Navalism, and Gunboats—a Literature Review

Since the days of the Congressional gunboat debates, historians and other interested
parties have tried to understand Jefferson’s gunboat program. Some have interpreted the
gunboats through the popular issues of their day; others sought to use the program as
ammunition for purposes of their own. Recent historians generally agree the gunboat program
was not particularly successful but was a reasonable program under the conditions Jefferson and
Congress experienced during the early-nineteenth century.
After the disappointing performance of Jefferson’s gunboats during the War of 1812
many early histories carried a distinct “Federalist bias.”8 Some attributed American progress to
Federalist policy and portrayed Republican and Jeffersonian policy as an unfortunate historical
dead end. An author with personal experience aboard gunboats wrote one of the first naval
histories of the United States. Prior to writing The Last of the Mohicans, James Fenimore
Cooper served as a junior officer aboard various U.S. Navy vessels including gunboats. His
three-volume History of the Navy of the United States, published in 1856, does not hide his
scorn; he argued that the gunboats “threatened destruction to the pride, discipline, tone, and even
morals of the service.”9 Jefferson did not escape censure; Cooper contended that Jefferson and
his Republican colleagues “misdirected the resources of a great and growing country.”10

8
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Furthermore, Jefferson’s gunboats were “entirely unfitted to the moral character of the people,
[and] to the natural formation of the coast.”11
Historian Henry Adams devoted considerable attention to Jefferson’s naval policy in
History of the United States, published between 1891 and 1896. Unlike Cooper, Adams was
somewhat sympathetic, and wrote, “Their theory was reasonable. A coast like that of America
could not be protected by fixed fortifications alone—only some system of movable batteries
could answer the whole purpose.”12 However, Adams ultimately concluded “most seagoing
people pronounced it a failure,” and argued Jefferson’s national defense policy was a poor fit for
the circumstances of the time.13 While, “A policy of neglecting defense might be safe in peace,
when foreign nations had every interest to avoid a war,” he wrote Jefferson should have taken
more aggressive action in light of that French and English attacks on American merchant vessels
and the Spanish threats against New Orleans.14
Historians of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century drew heavily on Adam’s
work; unlike Adams, most were more nationalistic and less sympathetic. Many nationalists
blamed the Republicans, including Congressional representatives, and especially Jefferson for
leaving the United States undefended prior to the War of 1812. Perhaps the harshest words for
Jefferson and his fellow Republicans came from twenty-sixth President Theodore Roosevelt.
Roosevelt critiqued Jefferson’s naval policies in 1882 as an undergraduate in The Naval War of
1812. Roosevelt argued the gunboat system and Republican distrust for professional soldiers
exposed the United States to foreign invasion. He wrote, “History has not yet done justice to the
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ludicrous and painful folly and stupidity of which the government founded by Jefferson, and
carried on by Madison, was guilty.”15
As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt used the memory of the War of 1812 as
leverage in his quest for a stronger navy. In a 1897 address delivered to the Naval War College,
Roosevelt proclaimed, “The men who opposed the War of 1812, and prepared to have the nation
humiliated by unresented insult from a foreign power rather than see her suffer the losses of an
honorable conflict, occupied a position little short of contemptible.”16 Roosevelt suggested,
“The visionary schemes for defending the country by gunboats, instead of by a fleet of seagoing
battle ships” showed “the truth of Washington’s adage, that in time of peace it is necessary to
prepare for war.”17
As an instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy, Alfred Thayer Mahan studied how navies
function as instruments of foreign policy and prepared young naval officers to project American
power internationally. Many naval officers and historians consider his books essential to any
review of naval policy. In his best known text, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 16601783, Mahan argued, “In 1814, the occupation of the Chesapeake and the destruction of
Washington gave a sharp lesson of the dangers incurred through the noblest water-ways, if their
approaches be undefended.”18 In Sea Power and its Relations to the War of 1812, Mahan
blamed the Jefferson administration for the lack of naval defense. He wrote, “[It] is
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impossible…to justify the Administration for refraining from adequate deeds, when the
impotence of words had been fully and finally proved.”19
In the 1939 book Rise of American Naval Power, Harold and Margaret Sprout agreed that
gunboats represented “an unsound line of naval development,” but unlike Mahan and Roosevelt
blamed Jefferson’s cabinet and Congressional Republicans as well for their role in implementing
Jefferson’s program.20 Additionally, the Sprouts noted that while Jefferson and his advisors
should have realized a gunboat navy could not answer a foreign blockade, “It is even stranger
that prominent captains of the regular Navy, when consulted, should have failed to call this point
to the President’s attention.”21
The Sprout’s opinions persisted despite the efforts of later historians who accused the
Sprouts of not accounting for differences in opinion regarding the navy among Republicans.22
Jack K. Bauer, founder of the North American Society for Oceanic History, perpetuated the
Sprout’s legacy. In 1965, he called the Jeffersonian gunboat program the “nadir of the navy’s
construction programs.”23 Bauer blamed Jefferson’s overriding concern for reducing
government spending and “fear that an ocean-going navy would bring clashes with foreign
powers” for his decision to turn the U.S. Navy into “an impotent local defense force.”24
In the latter half of the twentieth century, historians turned from nationalistic
interpretations of Jefferson’s policies to examine economic and political factors which may have
influenced Republican naval and defense policies during Jefferson’s administration. The debate
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changed from whether gunboats or frigates were better policy choices to why gunboats were so
attractive. In 1943, Charles Beard suggested Jefferson’s policies were motivated by competing
priorities between southern agrarians and northern merchants. Beard asserted that, “[Jefferson’s]
sympathies and affiliations were with the agrarian class.”25 While Jefferson would have liked to
completely dispose of all vestiges of the preceding Federalist administrations, including the
Navy, “The capitalistic interests…could not be suddenly overthrown. Compromise was
therefore necessary.”26 None the less, Beard believed Jefferson was committed to the
“fulfillment of the promises made to the famers—particularly the pledge to reduce the burden of
taxation and the public debt.”27 Therefore, according to Beard, Jefferson was motivated by his
promises to Southern agrarian gentry to end construction of seagoing warships and concentrate
on defensive gunboats.
Like Beard, Jeffersonian historian Merrill Peterson cited the influence of economic
factors on Jefferson’s policies in his 1970 book Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A
Biography. Peterson noted Jefferson’s decisions were consistent with traditional Republican
beliefs and that, “In a country where peace was a moral commitment and the normal state of
things, a regular army was as wasteful and unnecessary as it was dangerous.”28 Peterson argued
Jefferson’s decision to concentrate on defensive gunboats rather than sea-going warships was
due to construction cost and the low probability of war. While Peterson argued Jefferson
supported commerce, he “did not believe its defense warranted the expense of a large navy and
the attendant risk of war.”29
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As historians considered the economic influences on Jefferson’s administration, some
pragmatist/revisionist historians concluded Republican Congressional and presidential policies of
the time represented reasonable policies in light of the influences of the time. Claude Bowers
took the forefront of the Jefferson revision with a series of books and articles that occasionally
veered dangerously close to hero worship. In contrast to Roosevelt’s interpretation of Jefferson
as incompetent, Bowers depicted Jefferson as a consummate politician driven to preserve
democracy. He argued in 1926 that Jefferson “was the politician of a cause, and that cause was
one of liberty, humanity, and democracy.”30
Julia H. Macleod defended Jefferson, and challenged the Sprouts specifically, in 1945.
Macleod argued the Sprouts overstated Jefferson’s antagonism to the Navy, and claimed “much
of the disparagement of Jefferson appears to be the result of misunderstanding and
misrepresentation.”31 She added, “There seem to be no grounds for the supposition that he ever
thought [gunboats] would take the place of frigates.”32 Furthermore, not only did Macleod
believe Jefferson’s program was misunderstood by many historians, she argued the gunboats
were never used as Jefferson intended by contemporary naval officers.33
In 1955 J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton took specific aim at Roosevelt and suggested that
Roosevelt’s criticism reflected his own hawkish nature. Hamilton wrote, “No one familiar with
the mental and emotional processes of Theodore Roosevelt would find cause for surprise in his
dislike of Jefferson.”34 He also addressed Roosevelt’s attack on Jefferson’s pacifism and
conceded that, “Peace to [Jefferson] was the only assurance of the happiness of mankind, and
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passionately he extolled its blessings and sought to preserve it.”35 However, Hamilton argued
that Jefferson was willing to use force when it was needed, and cited Jefferson’s naval action
against the Barbary states. Further, Hamilton believed Jefferson’s interest in gunboats and
fortifications for American harbors showed the value he placed on defending trade.
Other historians studied Jefferson’s advisors. Alexander S. Balinky explored Jefferson’s
Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin’s role in setting naval policy. Balinky argued Gallatin
was motivated by Republican political ideals and reducing Federal debt, and shared equal
responsibility with Jefferson, Madison, and the Republican Congress for the naval policies they
enacted. “The triumvirate of Jefferson, Madison, and Gallatin,” he wrote, “Strove to reduce the
total role of government—and its costs in terms of the tax burden—to the barest possible
minimum.”36
Naval historian Craig L. Symonds was among the first to examine the Congressional
debates over naval appropriations. He provided a comprehensive overview of the gunboat
program in his 1980 book Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United
States. Close examination of the Annals of Congress allowed him to analyze other, previously
unconsidered, perspectives beyond Jefferson and Gallatin, and show Congressional debate was
not over whether or not to build a navy, but rather what sort to build. Therefore, “The common
judgement of naval historians regarding this period of United States naval policy—that
Republican opponents of the navy were irresponsible ideologues—falls apart when the full
meaning of the naval policy debate is appreciated.”37 Symonds turned the argument that
Hamilton, “The Pacifism of Thomas Jefferson,” 611.
Alexander S. Balinky, “Albert Gallatin, Naval Foe,” in The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and
Biography 82, no. 3 (July 1958), 293.
37
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35
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Jefferson irresponsibly failed to defend American seagoing commerce and coastlines upside
down and translated the debate into more historically accurate terms. Symonds suggested
instead, “It was the Navalists…who were promoting irresponsible national programs at a time
when the United States had all it could do to hold the western Indians in check.”38
In his 1992 article titled “The Influence of History Upon Seapower: The Navalist
Reinterpretation of the War of 1812,” Mark Russell Shulman noted many pro-navy authors of
the nationalist school used Jefferson’s gunboats and the War of 1812 as ammunition in the larger
naval policy debate. He contended, “The historical debate about the previously obscure AngloAmerican war of 1812-15 became an intellectual forum used by “Blue Water” navalist historians
in the United States to support their contemporary political agenda.”39 Therefore, he urged
caution in the use of Mahan and Roosevelt. In 1997 Peter Kastor agreed with Shulman that the
classic histories should be reevaluated. He suggested historians typically align with Mahan and
Roosevelt without consideration of Jefferson’s surrounding context or the surroundings of
Mahan and Roosevelt.40 Instead, Kastor argued that early 19th century naval policy was not just
anti-naval feeling, but was rather an “example of the intersection of military strategy, political
economy, and political process.”41
In their 2010 analysis of Jefferson and Madison’s successive Republican administrations,
Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg agreed with Hamilton and Symonds that the Republicans
were not opposed to all naval defense. Rather, the Republicans opposed a naval fleet with
offensive capabilities. As evidence of his interest in defensive measures, Burstein and Isenberg
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reminded their readers Jefferson believed American harbor defenses to be so deficient that he
requested more. They also wrote, “Jefferson called for a better organized militia, ready for any
‘sudden emergency,’” and “asked Congress for gunboats to meet the dangers posed by the
European belligerents.”42
Revisionists and pragmatists forced historians to look deeper into Jefferson’s personality
and personal beliefs and to examine the role played by Jefferson’s advisors and fellow
Republicans. Some scholars shifted their focus still further to explore how republicanism
contributed to Jeffersonian naval policy. In 1990, Lynton K. Caldwell argued Jefferson’s ideals
and vision of American democracy contributed to his advocacy for a citizen’s gunboat navy.
Caldwell wrote Jefferson’s theories about national defense were grounded in his belief in “a
highly decentralized, participatory democracy in which every citizen, personally, would have a
part in the administration of public affairs.”43 Therefore, Jefferson believed American citizens
should participate in their own defense in the same way they participated in their own
governance.
In his 1998 political biography American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson,
author Joseph J. Ellis also alluded to Jefferson’s belief in participatory government and defense.
Ellis argued, however, what Jefferson truly sought was “the recovery of ‘pure republicanism,’”
which meant the protection of individual rights and self-government through respect for the will
of the American majority.44 Regardless, Jefferson’s republicanism influenced his view that the
citizen-soldier or sailor was the most democratic means of national defense.
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In 2007, Peter Onuf wrote in The Mind of Thomas Jefferson that, “Jefferson’s image of
the citizen-soldier represented the ultimate convergence of state and society.”45 Onuf took
analysis of Jefferson’s republicanism a step further, however, and argued Jefferson not only
believed standing militaries were dangerous to the Republic, but the militia would allow the
government to “[exercise] conventional military power” and also protect citizens from
government “encroaching on their rights and violating the fundamental principle of consent.”46
Jerry Mashaw arrived at a similar conclusion. He wrote Jefferson feared military control
of the government, and “viewed the Army, commanded by the President, as a threat to
democracy itself.”47 Mashaw also believed partisan rancor motivated some Republican’s antinavy convictions; “Convinced that the ascendancy of the Republican Party had saved the
Republic,” he wrote, “Jefferson and his supporters subscribed to a ‘Republican’ ideology that
was anti-Federalist at almost every major point.”48
As historians examined the larger context of Jefferson’s government and realized the role
played by the Republican Congress, some moved away from the interpretations of Roosevelt et.
al. as well as the sympathetic interpretations of Macleod and Hamilton in favor of a more
balanced position. They sought to show why the gunboat system was not successful, and
simultaneously explain why it was so popular with the Republicans.
The Jeffersonian Gunboat Navy, written by Spencer Tucker in 1993, provided a
comprehensive examination of the gunboats themselves, with little attention given to the
program’s political background. Spencer wrote, “The Jeffersonian gunboats do not represent the
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triumph of a weapons system, nor were they a total failure.”49 While he noted the small
American navy benefitted the British during the War of 1812, he also wrote the gunboats were
not a product of Jefferson alone, but that “Republican majorities in Congress as well as public
opinion strongly supported it. Given the public attitude, there could have been no significant
expansion of the seagoing navy prior to the War of 1812.”50
Gene A. Smith provided a more complete treatment of the political background of
Jefferson’s gunboat plan in his 1995 book For the Purposes of Defense: The Politics of the
Jeffersonian Gunboat Program. Smith argued Jefferson was not totally anti-navy and “did
desire a modest blue-water force to complement coastal fortifications, gunboats, and other
defensive works.”51 However, he also noted Jefferson was a realist who recognized the United
States enjoyed significant natural defense in the form of the Atlantic Ocean. He wrote, “Thus, a
small naval force served double duty: it satisfied Republican opposition to large permanent
establishments and helped reduce the national debt.”52 Finally, rather than blame the gunboat’s
failure during the War of 1812 on Jefferson’s faulty understanding of naval tactics, Smith
believed the program was ultimately mishandled by the naval officers tasked with its operation,
and fell victim to the politics of the day.53
In 2001, E. M. Halliday echoed earlier historians including Claude Bowers on Jefferson’s
belief in individual liberty, and argued, “Jefferson’s dream focused above all on a free
society…with individuals guaranteed the right to think as they pleased.”54 Therefore, Bowers
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argued the gunboat program grew out of Jefferson’s desire to protect individual liberty from
military depredations; Halliday also suggested Jeffersonian politics were a precursor to the
contest between the political right and left.55
Ian Toll devoted his 2006 book Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the
U.S. Navy to the early history of the US Navy and the naval appropriation debates. Toll echoed
Onuf, Mashaw, and others with his argument that Republicans approved of the gunboat navy
because it transferred the militia system, “[their] cherished archetype of national defense,” to
naval warfare.56 However, Toll noted that ultimately, the gunboats were unsuccessful weapons.
They were difficult to sail in stormy conditions and could not absorb battle damage without
sinking. Further, “They were nearly impossible to man. Of the 278 gunboats authorized by
Congress between 1805 and 1807, only 176 were actually built, and fewer placed into service.”57
With so many divergent opinions to navigate, making sense of the gunboat program and
early naval appropriation debates is a daunting task. The context of the time and the theories
which undergirded the debates is highly relevant, and any new examination, therefore, should
start with a consideration of Thomas Jefferson.
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Chapter 2
Thomas Jefferson’s Naval Policy

At the root of the American gunboat program was third President of the United States,
author of The Declaration of Independence, Virginia-planter, and founder of the University of
Virginia Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson believed his election as president in 1801 was an
opportunity to recapture the “spirit of revolution” that animated the earliest days of the American
nation, and he sought to return to a “spirit of true republicanism.” His naval polices, especially
the gunboat program, are a controversial component of his legacy. Jefferson’s true beliefs
remain elusive, despite the vast amount of his writing which survives, due to the nuances of his
opinions and the evolution of his thought over time. Merrill D. Peterson, author of several books
that examined Jefferson’s life and legacy, noted, “The tributaries of [Jefferson’s] mind ran in all
directions,” and admitted “It is a mortifying confession but he remains for me, finally, an
impenetrable man.”58 As noted in the literature review, a wide array of opinions regarding
Jefferson’s naval policies muddy the water further and increase the struggle to interpret the man;
readers may be forgiven for doubts about the productivity of further contributions on the subject.
Even Joseph J. Ellis, author of American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson, admitted
doubts at the beginning of his study of Jefferson, and suggested, “The publication of all new
books about that man from Monticello [should] be accompanied by a formal declaration of the
causes that have impelled the author to undertake the effort.”59 No easy answer exists, and the
risk of misinterpreting Jefferson is ever present. However, Gene A. Smith, author of the most
recent examination of Jefferson’s naval policy, wrote, “Just as Jefferson’s life demands
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reevaluation, so do his views on gunboats, defense, and the navy’s role in national security.”60
Twenty-four years have passed since Smith re-evaluated Jefferson’s gunboat program. Despite
contrary claims, Jefferson was not totally against the navy. Rather, Jefferson asked for the
construction of a small naval squadron and coastal defense gunboats after demonstrations of their
strategic usefulness, as part of a larger, multi-part maritime defense plan consistent with his and
his fellow Republican’s political principles and designed to protect the fledgling United States
from international repercussions.
Jefferson’s naval policies and gunboat program were heavily influenced by the
surrounding political and social milieu. Interested citizens and politicians shared their views
with the President in frequent letters. Jefferson, ever the savvy politician, seemed to appreciate
the advice. He wrote it was “useful that the executive should hear all things and hold fast that
which is good.”61 Fellow Republicans, many outright antinavalists and opposed to any attempt
to establish a navy, were especially vocal about their desire to reduce military’s size.
Jefferson was not the only gunboat advocate. Author of Common Sense Thomas Paine
contributed to Jefferson’s thought on gunboats starting in 1801. Paine lived in France at the
time. Prior to writing Jefferson, he wrote Napoleon Bonaparte to propose the French
Government build a flotilla of gunboats, each mounting one or two cannons, for an attack across
the English Channel on Great Britain. “The only relief that France could have given,” he argued
to Jefferson, “Would have been to have kept a strong fleet of gunboats on the [Belgian] Coast, to
be rowed by oars, and capable of transporting an hundred thousand Men over to the English

60

Smith, For the Purposes of Defense, 1.
Thomas Jefferson, “From Thomas Jefferson to Henry Dearborn, 3 January 1805,” Founders Online,
National Archives, accessed April 11, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-0938.
61

21

Coast on the North Sea.” When Napoleon showed no interest, he sent a copy of his proposal to
Jefferson.62 It was not the last letter from Paine on the subject.
In 1807, as Jefferson’s gunboat program moved ahead, Paine designed an improved
gunboat and sent Jefferson a model. The new design was armed with two cannons in the bow.
Paine wrote his design “will increase the power of a gunboat in nearly the proportion of 20 to
12.”63 Jefferson acknowledged receipt of the model, and while he admitted he was unqualified
to judge the merits of the design, he sent Paine’s model to the Secretary of the Navy.64 He was
delighted with Paine’s model. “Believing myself that gunboats are the only water defence which
can be useful to us, and protect us from the ruinous folly of a navy,” he wrote, “I am pleased
with everything which promises to improve them.”65
Jefferson’s cabinet members were also influential. Former Pennsylvania Congressman
and Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin was an especially vocal source of antinaval rhetoric
in Jefferson’s political orbit. Gallatin was motivated by his desire to pay off the national debt,
and viewed naval spending as inherently “unproductive, wasteful, and destructive.”66 In
Congress, he earned a reputation as a staunch critic of military spending. He argued against
building 74-gun battleships during Congressional debate in 1799. “The conclusion must be most
forcible,” he announced, “That it is improper at present to build a navy, especially since there is
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no immediate demand for it.”67 Jefferson took notice and enclosed a copy of Gallatin’s speech
with a letter to fellow Virginia lawyer Edmund Pendleton. He wrote, “The views he takes of our
finances and of the policy of our undertaking to establish a great navy may furnish some hints”
for correcting the Federalists’ “ruinous principles and practices.”68
Once in office, Jefferson sought Gallatin’s opinions on naval expenditures and policy
frequently. On March 14, 1801, a mere two weeks after Jefferson’s inauguration, Gallatin sent
Jefferson his recommendations for trimming federal spending. The military did not escape his
notice. Gallatin drew attention to Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert’s budget, and wrote
that he “took the liberty of suggesting in what manner the reduction took place,” but stressed that
his thoughts were for illustrative purposes only.69 Gallatin wrote that his point was to
“impress…the necessity of a great reduction” in military spending.70
Gallatin also vetted several of Jefferson’s yearly Congressional addresses.71 For
Jefferson’s first State of the Union address to the Seventh Congress, Gallatin suggested Jefferson
highlight the positive effect on trade caused by deployment of warships to the Mediterranean to
fight the Barbary corsairs.72 Gallatin also supported Jefferson’s desire to maintain peace with
Europe instead of build additional warships. He wrote, “The greater increase of wealth is due in
part to our natural situation, but principally to our neutrality [emphasis original] during the war;
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an evident proof of the advantages of peace notwithstanding the depredations of the belligerent
powers.”73
Gallatin was comfortable respectfully expressing his dissent with Jefferson’s policies. In
1805, distressed by the amount of money spent by the Navy despite his requests it reduce
expenditures, Gallatin wrote he was forced to conclude, “Either the [Department of] War is
better organized than the Navy Department, or that naval business cannot be conducted on
reasonable terms.”74 He concluded sourly, “On this subject, the expense of the navy… I have,
for the sake of preserving perfect harmony in your [Jefferson’s] councils, however grating to my
feelings, been almost uniformly silent.”75
Gallatin was a key supporter of Jefferson’s gunboat plan because of the lower cost of
construction for gunboats compared to frigates and battleships. Jefferson asked Gallatin to
critique his State of the Union address, which included a request for gunboat appropriations,
again in 1804. Gallatin wrote he supported Jefferson’s plan, as long as “the expenditures shall be
kept within due bounds.”76 Despite his fiscally conservative nature, even Gallatin would spend
money on the navy when necessary. On June 22, 1807 the British frigate HMS Leopard attacked
and captured the American frigate USS Chesapeake in the Chesapeake Bay.77 The embarrassing
incident convinced Jefferson more gunboats were needed. The apparent British threat overcame
Gallatin’s usual unwillingness to spend federal funds and he advised Jefferson, “We ought to
build now all those [gunboats] that are wanted for the Mississippi, and also that number which it
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may be thought proper to keep afloat in time of European war in the other ports.”78 He also sent
Jefferson a Memorandum of Preparatory Measures, “Which may be adopted by the Executive in
relation to war, defensive and offensive.”79 Under the heading “Gunboats and water defenses,”
Gallatin recommended that money be appropriated to complete all gunboats under construction
and to buy materials to build more.80
Republicans in Congress also influenced Jefferson’s naval policies. North Carolina
representative, Speaker of the House, and staunch antinavalist Nathaniel Macon bluntly
expressed his belief “that the people expect” the army to be made smaller and “the navy might
also be reduced” in an April 1801 letter to Jefferson, sent less than two months after his
inauguration.81 Jefferson responded several days later, and reported the ongoing “chaste
reformation” of the Army. He also pledged to return the Navy “to the legal establishment by the
last of this month.”82
Jefferson distrusted large “blue-water” navies for myriad reasons, but especially on
philosophical grounds. While Jefferson primarily feared the Army was dangerous to the
Republic, his interest in naval militia suggests some of this distrust may have transferred to the
Navy as well. Jefferson’s desire to establish a government based on the principle of “pure
republicanism” was especially important, and these considerations contributed to Jefferson’s
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interest in gunboats.83 Joseph J. Ellis considered Jefferson’s motivations in American Sphinx:
The Character of Thomas Jefferson, and suggested Jefferson believed “[His] elevation to the
presidency did not symbolize the ascendance of the ordinary so much as the restoration of
revolutionary austerity.”84 Jefferson hinted at what republicanism was for him in his first
inaugural address, which bears reproduction in some length:
What more is necessary to make us a happy and a prosperous people? Still one
thing more, fellow-citizens—a wise and frugal Government, which shall restrain
men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their
own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of
labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government, and this is
necessary to close the circle of our felicities.85
Additionally, Jefferson pledged his absolute belief in democratic self-government. He
cited his faith in “absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority, the vital principle of
republics, from which is no appeal but to force, the vital principle and immediate parent of
despotism.”86 The final clause is telling. Jefferson believed adherence to the will of the
governed was the most vital part of a republican society; in contrast, he saw reliance on force as
antithetical to a republic and linked inextricably to tyranny. Therefore, in Jefferson’s opinion the
maintenance of professional armies and navies during peacetime smacked of despotism, and was
to be avoided.
Jefferson’s republicanism was heavily influenced by English Whigs, who resisted
government attempts to curtail personal liberty and peace-time armies throughout British history.
British Inspector-General Argus Centoculi proclaimed in 1751, “The detestable policies of the
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last Reigns were…to disarm the People, and make the Militia useless” and simultaneously
maintain an army “in order to bring in Popery and Slavery.”87 In 1802 English Whig, political
essayist, and Anglican priest Vicesimus Knox wrote, “Standing armies are…the glory and
delight of all who are actuated by the spirit of despotism.”88 In the United States in 1799,
Thomas Cooper called standing armies “the grand engine, the most useful instrument of despotic
ambition.” He argued they “[render] a Militia idle, and therefore useless and contemptible.” 89
Even more damning for Cooper was the use of professional armies by European monarchs
“against the friends and principles of liberty” within their own countries.90
Jefferson and other Republicans believed a standing military would cause the end of
personal liberty and their way of life; not afraid to publish their views for the general public,
many roundly criticized generally pro-military Federalists in the press. William Cobbett argued
in 1801 against “that ‘cheap defense of nations,’ a navy!” established by Federalist and former
President John Adams. Cobbett stated, “These can never be contemplated by the Republican
Rush-Light.”91 Adams was not the only prominent Federalist ridiculed by Republican antimilitary literature. In response to Massachusetts Federalist Fisher Ames, Benjamin Austin
accused Federalists of seeking a war establishment to allow them “to riot in luxury amid the
general distress, and impoverishment of the country.” He argued a standing army, under
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Federalist control, would be a tool “to force the people into compliance with their arbitrary
mandates.”92
Prior to its adoption, Jefferson wrote freely he was disappointed the U.S. Constitution
lacked a bill of rights to protect American citizens from standing armies. He was also disturbed
by no guarantee of “freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against standing
armies, restriction against monopolies, the eternal and unremitting force of the habeas corpus
laws, and trials by jury,” and expressed his trepidation in letters to various correspondents
including James Madison, New York representative William Stephens Smith, Scottish
entrepreneur Alexander Donald, and diplomat C.W.F. Dumas.93 His letter to Smith was
particularly indignant. He wrote, “I own it astonishes me” to find that many Americans did not
share his fear of a government with unlimited power.94
In 1799, Napoleon Bonaparte, supported by the French army, took power in France
following a coup. Napoleon’s coup was a graphic example for Jefferson of the danger posed to a
republican nation by a standing army, “without which, it is evident Bonaparte could not have
accomplished it, nor could not maintain it.”95 While the situation in France distressed Jefferson,
it did not diminish his confidence in the principle of self-governance. He wrote to Samuel
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Adams in 1800 that while some “will use this as a lesson against the impracticability of
republican government…I read it as a lesson against the danger of standing armies.”96
In contrast, gunboats manned by volunteer militia were far more acceptable to Jefferson’s
republicanism. Jefferson believed the militia would mitigate the danger of professional
militaries and be adequate for national defense. Jefferson biographer Peter Onuf argued
Jefferson viewed the “citizen-solder” as an essential guardian of republicanism and a critical
defence against tyranny. Onuf wrote, “Jefferson looked forward to a time when the army would
be so thoroughly identified with a self-governing people that civil-military conflict would be
unthinkable.”97 As President, Jefferson sought assistance from state governors to form the
militia into an adequate defense force. He encouraged state leaders to “carry into effect the
militia system adopted by the national legislature, agreeably to the powers reserved to the states
respectively, by the constitution of the U.S.”98 Jefferson shared his defense policy with Elbridge
Gerry in a letter prior to his inauguration and wrote he supported “such a naval force only as may
protect our coasts and harbours from such depredations as we have experienced,” rather than
commit to a large naval fleet “which by its own expenses and the eternal wars in which it will
implicate us, will grind us with public burthens, and sink us under them.”99
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Jefferson’s gunboat plan extended the militia concept to the water. Naval historian Ian
Toll wrote, “Just as the infantry militia was the Republican alternative to a standing army,
gunboats offered an alternative to a standing navy.”100 To this end, Jefferson envisioned a
gunboat force that lay dormant until needed. To crew the gunboats, Jefferson hoped to establish
a nucleus of professional naval officers and supplement them with a naval militia of merchant
sailors. In 1805, Jefferson proposed legislation titled “A Bill for Establishing a Naval Militia”
which required, “Every free, able-bodied white male citizen of the United States, of the age of 18
years, and under the age of 45, whose principal occupation is on the high sea or on the tidewaters within the United States, shall be of the militia for the naval service of the United
States.”101 The program emphasized economy, and attempted to minimize replacement and
repair of boats and equipment. Like the muskets and other equipment of the land militia, which
were stored in armories when not in the field, the gunboats themselves were to be stored out of
the water in large sheds when not in use. When a threat materialized and the gunboats were
activated, they would return to service “by prepar[ed] ways and [capstans] proper for it, and
always ready to let her down again” into the water.102
While Jefferson was always a farmer at heart, and despite his self-proclaimed belief that
“cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens,” Jefferson’s letters demonstrate
willingness to defend maritime trade.103 Indeed, in Notes on the State of Virginia, written in
1781-2, Jefferson wrote that the United States should engage in seaborne commerce despite his
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fear that “wars then must sometimes be our lot.”104 He echoed this belief in a letter to John Jay,
and added American constituents expected their elected public servants to preserve access to the
ocean for commercial purposes. Elected officials, in turn, should pursue “that line of
policy…which will render the use of that element as great as possible to them…and that
therefore we should in every instance preserve an equality of right to them in the transportation
of commodities, in the right of fishing, and in the other uses of the sea.”105 Jefferson believed
the answer was to establish a naval force sufficient to “punish” foreign naval depredation.
“Weakness provokes insult and injury, while a condition to punish it often prevents it,” he wrote
to Jay. “This reasoning leads to the necessity of some naval force, that being the only weapo[n]
with which we can reach an enemy.”106
Jefferson abhorred war in general and was inclined toward mutually beneficial trade. He
wrote in 1782, “With such a country before us to fill with people and happiness, we should point
in that direction the whole generative force of nature, wasting none of it in efforts of mutual
destruction.”107 Despite his personal tendencies Jefferson did not hesitate to exert naval force
when appropriate, and his willingness to meet force with force was evident prior to his
presidency. When the British navy threatened the New England coast in 1779, Jefferson
suggested the colonies create a small naval force to meet the threat. He wrote to Richard Henry
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Lee such efforts “must be small and would probably be unsuccessful;” nevertheless, he believed
an adequate naval defense “must have a beginning and the sooner the better.”108
Twenty-two years later, an international crisis allowed Jefferson to again advocate for
naval force and proved a defining event of his presidency. In the Mediterranean, pirates
sponsored by the kingdoms of Tripoli, Algiers, Tunis, and Morocco (collectively the Barbary
States) preyed upon American merchant shipping and sailors. North African piracy was not new,
but American shipping was newly vulnerable due to an increase in piracy and lack of tribute;
while Barbary coast piracy declined during the 1750s, piracy expanded in the 1780s, and
continued to do so during Jefferson administration.109 Additionally, European powers paid
yearly tribute, essentially bribes, to protect their ships and crews from capture and enslavement
rather than continuously deploy warships to fight the Barbary corsairs. Prior to the American
Revolution, American ships and crews were protected by British tribute. Under this protection
American merchants had developed a thriving, lucrative trade network in southern Europe and
northern Africa.110 Following American independence, and subsequent loss of British naval
protection, Alan G. Jamieson wrote, “As the USA had no navy it was in a particularly vulnerable
position in the 1780s…By the end of 1793 the Algerines had taken a dozen American prizes and
held over 100 Americans as captives.”111 Jefferson, in his first year as president, was forced to
consider how best to manage the threat in the Mediterranean.
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Prior to his inauguration, Jefferson advocated a strong naval response to the Barbary
states. In a December 13, 1784 letter to former Revolutionary War general Horatio Gates,
Jefferson noted the capture of a Virginia merchant vessel by Moroccan corsairs. Frustrated by
Barbary infringement on American trade, he stated, “Tribute or war is the usual alternative of
these pirates.”112 Due to the excessive sum required to bribe the pirates, Jefferson argued, “Why
not begin a navy then and decide on war? We cannot begin in a better cause nor against a
weaker foe.”113 Jefferson expressed similar ideas in a letter to James Monroe in February 1785
and called the “pyratical [sic]” situation faced by American merchants in the Mediterranean
“distressing.”114 Jefferson called again for a naval response to the corsairs, and wrote, “The
motives pleading for war rather than tribute are numerous and honorable, those opposing them
are mean and shortsighted.”115 Despite Jefferson’s suggestions, the U.S. Government elected to
negotiate with the Barbary powers and ultimately established treaties which required large sums
in tribute to temporarily buy protection for the merchant fleet.116
After he became Commander in Chief, Jefferson took military action. Within his first
year as president, Jefferson dispatched a small “squadron of observation” consisting of three
frigates and several smaller warships to blockade Tripoli, pursue pirate ships and crews, and
protect American commercial interests in the region.117 The U.S. Navy maintained an almost
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constant presence in the Mediterranean for the next four years. Jefferson also approved
legislation which allowed him to take further action against piracy. Most notably, “An Act for
the Protection of the Commerce and Seamen of the United States, Against the Tripolitan
Cruisers” empowered him, “To equip, officer, man, and employ such of the armed vessels of the
United States as may be judged requisite by the President of the United States, for protecting
effectually the commerce and seamen thereof on the Atlantic ocean, the Mediterranean and
adjoining seas.”118 In accordance with the law, on February 18, 1802 Jefferson informed
commanders of American warships, “You are hereby authorized and directed to subdue, seize,
and make prize, of all vessels, goods, and effects, belonging to the Bey of Tripoli, or to his
subjects, and to bring or send the same into port, to be proceeded against and distributed
according to law.”119 Jefferson’s efforts ultimately ended American tribute payments, and
resulted in a treaty with the rulers of Tripoli which Congress ratified in 1805; despite his success,
Jefferson’s measures were temporary, and conflicts in the region with corsairs continued until
1815.
Ironically, the First Barbary War anticipated the “gunboat diplomacy” which Roosevelt
and Mahan, perhaps Jefferson’s most vocal critics with regard to naval policy, espoused so
strongly. Jefferson’s actions were not unusual; many nineteenth-century European governments
used their navies to project power and protect international interests. The key difference,
however, was that Jefferson only used naval force when he believed the situation warranted
intervention.
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Economic considerations also influenced Jefferson’s interest in gunboats. Reduction of
the Federal debt and distrust of taxation were core principles for Jefferson and his fellow
Republicans. As Secretary of State, Jefferson disagreed vehemently with Federalist Alexander
Hamilton, who thought the Federal debt necessary for the nation’s financial prosperity. Jefferson
complained to James Monroe, “We are ruined, Sir, if we do not over-rule the principles that ‘the
more we owe, the more prosperous we shall be,’ ‘that a public debt furnishes the means of
enterprise,’ ‘that if ours should be once paid off, we should incur another by any means however
extravagant’ etc. etc.”120 Jefferson even claimed, in a letter to George Washington, Hamilton’s
program “flowed from principles adverse to liberty, and was calculated to undermine and
demolish the republic.”121 In contrast, Jefferson proclaimed his belief in “a government
rigorously frugal and simple, applying all the possible savings of the public revenue to the
discharge of the national debt.”122
Even if Jefferson was not committed to reducing Federal spending, he believed the
United States lacked the financial means to build, equip, and maintain a navy of battleships.
Therefore, Jefferson opposed calls for a large, European-style navy. In the past, he had called a
navy, “A foolish and wicked waste of the energies of our countrymen.”123 Gunboats were cheap,
however, and many could be built for the same cost as a frigate or battleship. Jefferson found
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this compelling. In his third request for gunboats, communicated to the House of
Representatives on February 10, 1807, Jefferson estimated building 127 additional gunboats
would “cost from five to six hundred thousand dollars,” or under five thousand dollars each.124
In contrast, Congressional documents show building the original six frigates of the U.S. Navy
cost an average of $276,000 each.125 Jefferson argued during times of peace, the maintenance
costs would be kept low as “no more than six or eight” gunboats would remain in service; “It
would only be when the United States should themselves be at war,” he continued, “That the
whole number would be brought into active service.”126 Until such a time, a skeleton crew
would maintain the gunboats, stored in sheds out of the water.
Jefferson was comfortable consigning America’s coastal defense to a few small boats
because he believed the best maritime defense for the United States was the Atlantic Ocean.
Jefferson recognized the strategic advantages of the Atlantic Ocean as a barrier to European
attack as early as 1782. Should a European power attempt to attack the American coast Jefferson
was sure, “A small part only of their naval force will ever be risked across the Atlantic.”
Jefferson argued crossing the ocean was dangerous for most European navies and exposed the
homeland to attack during the fleet’s absense.127 He concluded the threat of naval attack was
minimal, and European powers would “attack us by detachment only,” the United States needed
only enough naval force “to make ourselves equal to what they may detach.”128
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Despite the protection of the Atlantic, Jefferson still distrusted European politics. He
believed strongly the United States should not “meddle” or take part in European “broils”
beyond trade and commerce. As he explained to French philosopher and politician Constantin
François de Chassebœuf, Comte de Volney, too much interaction with Europe risked turning the
United States into “a spiteful unhappy nation.”129 His beliefs stemmed from nearly continuous
warfare between France and Great Britain during the 1790s and early 1800s, during which
American trade ships were seized by warships of both nations. As Washington’s Secretary of
State, Jefferson protested attacks on America’s trade, vessels, and sailors. He believed such
attacks would draw the United States into a European war it could not afford. In a 1793 letter to
Thomas Pinckney, the American Minister to Great Britain, Jefferson argued neutral powers
retained the right to trade without restriction, even with opposing combatants.130 Should French
and British depredations on American shipping continue, “We should see ourselves
plunged…into a war, with which we meddle not, and which we wish to avoid if justice to all
parties, and from all parties, will enable us to avoid it.”131 When, to Jefferson’s chagrin, Great
Britain and France continued to harass American shipping, Jefferson expressed displeasure to his
friend and law pupil Archibald Stuart but noted that there was little the United States could do;
“Our great expense will be in equipping a navy to be lost as fast as equipped,” he wrote, “Or to
be maintained at an expense which will sink us with itself.”132
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While the French navy was strong, the British Royal Navy was Jefferson’s primary
concern. The British depended on their navy, the most powerful in the world, for defense and to
maintain power abroad. Historian of the early United States Denver Brunsman argued the Royal
Navy was an international representation of British power and, for the Jeffersonians, tyranny.133
Jefferson took the danger of challenging the Royal Navy seriously, and calculated gunboats
would provide coastal protection without offending British naval supremacy.
The Battle of Copenhagen, on April 2, 1801, was a case study for Jefferson and his
compatriots that illustrated the consequences of challenging Great Britain at sea. The kingdoms
of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Prussia, and Russia used the same arguments as the U.S.
Government in the late 1790s and Jefferson himself as early as 1793 and asserted their right as
neutral powers to trade freely with France and Great Britain. They also argued their vessels had
the right, “To freely navigate from one harbor to another, and on the coast of the Belligerent
Nations.”134 To enforce their claims, the neutral powers formed the “League of Armed
Neutrality,” demanded the British stop searching neutral vessels for “contraband,” and organized
merchant vessels into convoys escorted by warships.135 The League also united the Russian,
Danish, and Norwegian navies in a combined fleet under Russian leadership, and based a large
percentage of the fleet’s warships at Copenhagen.
The League of Armed Neutrality challenged the British on both economic and strategic
fronts. Previously, the British government pursued a lenient policy in the region as it was
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imperative the Baltic nations remain neutral and not unite with France. For instance, National
Affairs for December 1784, a 1794 periodical stated, “We held high and peremptory language to
Denmark, Sweden, and other powers; to whom we are now obliged to give good words, and to
make some concessions, in order to keep them neutral at least, if not obtain their good offices at
Paris.”136 Now, with Baltic shipping necessary for the Britain’s continued ability to fight and
trade, especially due to the heavy demands of the Royal Navy’s blockade of continental Europe,
the British government was forced to weigh diplomacy against survival. Naval historian John D.
Grainger wrote Great Britain depended on Scandinavian ships to carry wood for masts and hulls,
hemp for ropes, and tar and pitch used for sealant, all produced in Denmark and Norway and
used for warship and merchant vessel construction.137
The strategic threat was twofold. First, strategic common sense demanded the British not
allow war materials to reach France, even on neutral ships. Therefore, the British Government
found the League’s demand they cease stopping and searching neutral merchant vessels for
weapons and other contraband, a measure they believed “reasonable,” was impossible to agree
to.138 Second, the combined Russian, Danish, and Norwegian fleet created by the “League of
Armed Neutrality” presented a naval threat the British, an island nation, could not ignore.
British naval historian William James wrote the treaty placed a large naval force of “Russia 82,
Denmark 23, and Sweden 18 sail of the line, besides, between them all, about 89 frigates,
corvettes, and brigs, and nearly twice the number of armed small-craft” in the Baltic.139 This
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naval force represented a significant strategic challenge to the Royal Navy, especially since it
was located a mere two or three-day voyage from the British Isles.140
As tensions in the Baltic rose, the British government sent ambassador Nicholas
Vansittart to Copenhagen “with full powers to treat,” and attempted to defuse the situation with
diplomacy.141 When negotiations failed, the British government dispatched Admiral Sir Hyde
Parker and the future hero of Trafalgar, then Vice-Admiral Horatio Lord Nelson, in command of
“Twenty line-of-battle ships…plus seven frigates and twenty-three smaller vessels, including
eight bombs,” and ordered them to subdue the combined fleet at Copenhagen and force the
Dutch to comply with British demands.142 Eyewitness accounts indicate the Dutch “made very
obstinate resistance, and fought like brave men.” However, during a five-hour engagement the
British fleet destroyed a number of Dutch and Norwegian warships, shelled Copenhagen,
inflicted around 3,000 casualties while suffering 1,000 killed and wounded in turn, and
ultimately forced Copenhagen to surrender.143
Nothing projected “His Britannic Majesty’s” power as clearly as the Royal Navy. The
preemptive raid on Copenhagen made Great Britain’s point eloquently. By the end of April, the
Russian government requested Admiral Parker “desist from all further hostilities against the flags
of the three United Powers,” and declared their intent to negotiate.144 Parker agreed, and
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expressed his hope, “That Russia and Great Britain will again be united, as formerly, by the ties
of friendship and harmony.”145 While the British were willing to consider minimizing the
number of neutral ships searched, as negotiations between British ambassador Lord St. Helens
and representatives of the Northern Powers progressed the British government refused to
surrender its naval advantage. In the May 1801 edition, the Gentleman’s Magazine and
Historical Chronical noted the continued presence of the British fleet in force at Copenhagen
should the Northern Powers “persevere in insisting on our abandoning the practice [of searching
neutral vessels] altogether.” Should negotiations break down, the Gentleman’s Magazine wrote
the navy, “Will recommence operations calculated effectually to overpower all further argument
on that head.”146 In the end, Nelson’s naval force was not required. Great Britain and the Baltic
powers signed a treaty at St. Petersburg at the end of April 1801, and preserved trade in the
Baltic on British terms. In August 1801 the Monthly Magazine observed, despite “our late
differences with the nations on the Baltic…Our Baltic Trade [emphasis original] has been
beginning to revive.”147
Jefferson was well aware of events in the Baltic Sea. He received frequent updates from
European envoys and cabinet members as the situation progressed. Attorney General Levi
Lincoln Sr. sent him information from Ambassador Rufus King in Great Britain, in an April 16,
1801 letter (after the British bombardment of Copenhagen). Rufus reported, “The situation of
[Great Britain] is critical and full of difficulties” and predicted, “England must and would resist
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the claims of the northern powers.”148 The American ambassador to Spain, David Humphreys,
also appraised Jefferson of the situation in the Baltic and forwarded Danish ambassador Baron de
Shubart’s account of the British attack. Humphreys wrote, “The undisguised observations of a
Man versed in politics, tho’ expressed in haste, on the spot, will frequently bring one better
acquainted with the real situation of affairs, than the most elaborate Diplomatic dissertations
when intended for the public eye.”149 Thomas Paine, who observed the situation from France,
provided the most terse assessment of the situation when he wrote Jefferson in August, 1801, and
announced, “The coalition of the North has vanished almost to nothing.”150
The lessons taught by the Royal Navy to the Northern Powers were not lost upon
Jefferson and his fellow Republicans. Great Britain would punish challenges to British policy
and British naval superiority harshly, and Jefferson knew the Royal Navy maintained strong
naval squadrons at Halifax and Bermuda. Naval historian Craig L. Symonds wrote Jefferson
feared Great Britain would view the construction of additional sea-going warships for the U.S.
Navy as a threat to the balance of power in the Atlantic.151 The British would likely have
increased the number of ships assigned to their North American squadrons at least. The worstcase scenario for Jefferson was the possibility of a preemptive attack on the U.S. fleet.152 As a
strictly defensive measure gunboats were less likely to result in confrontation with the British
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and would both preserve the balance of power in the Atlantic Ocean and protect the American
coast.
In addition to political and financial considerations, the widespread use of gunboats by
European navies convinced Jefferson gunboats would be effective weapons for coastal defense.
Ever the student of world affairs, Jefferson eagerly absorbed lessons from gunboat battles like
the Battle of the Liman, fought between the Russian and Turkish fleets in June 1788.
The entrance to the Liman, a tributary of the Dnieper River, was controlled by a Turkish
fort. Russian infantry needed naval artillery support from the river to successfully attack and
capture the fort; meanwhile the Turks used the river to supply their army in the field.153
Whichever side controlled the water, therefore, enjoyed a distinct strategic advantage. On June
7, a Russian fleet of small warships and gunboats commanded by American Revolutionary War
hero John Paul Jones and European adventurer Karl Heinrich von Nassau-Siegen met a force of
fifty-seven larger Turkish warships in the Liman.154 The shallow, brackish water laced with
sandbars prevented the larger, deeper-draft, sail-driven Turkish warships from maneuvering
freely, but was ideal for the shallow-draft, oar-driven Russian gunboats. Jones and NassauSiegen trapped the Turkish ships in a pincher maneuver and sank two. The rest were forced to
retreat. The Turkish fleet moved into the Liman again on the night of June 16. Once again,
many Turkish warships grounded on sandbars during the advance. In the morning, Jones and
Nassau-Siegen’s fleets attacked and burned the trapped Turkish ships and forced the rest to
retreat back to the protection of the fort.155
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Jefferson was fascinated by the engagement, and included accounts of the battle in letters
to James Monroe, John Jay, and John Brown Cutting.156 In his letter to Cutting, he noted the
disproportionate tactical effect of the smaller Russian gunboats, and how fifty-seven Turkish
vessels and their commander were compelled to retreat after “obstinate action.”157 He was also
impressed by the efficacy of the shallow-draft gunboats in the shallow, coastal environment of
the Liman. To Jay, he wrote the larger “ships of the line, frigates etc.,” after becoming “so
engaged in the mud that they could not maneuver,” were easy prey for the small, lightly armed
gunboats.158
Jefferson was not the only Republican who noticed the events in the Liman. Gallatin
reminded Jefferson of the Battle of the Liman as the President prepared a request for more
gunboats in 1807. Gallatin wrote, “The most splendid achievement by gunboats was the
destruction…of a great part of the Turkish fleet, under their celebrated Captain Pacha Hassan
Aly, in the Liman, or mouth of the Dnieper, by the Russian flotilla under Prince of Nassau.”159
Jefferson had forgotten about the battle; he thanked Gallatin for reminding him and wrote back,
“I thank you for the case in the Liman sea, which escaped my recollection, it was indeed a very
favorable one.”160
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The experience of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean also convinced Jefferson of the
merit of his gunboat proposals. The American naval squadron at Tripoli found themselves
unable to pursue small pirate vessels or approach the harbor in their large warships due to the
many shoals and sandbars that made the water too shallow. The squadron’s commander,
Commodore Edward Preble, observed the wide-spread use of gunboats among the surrounding
Mediterranean navies, and borrowed eight gunboats and two bomb vessels from the King of
Naples.161 American officers and sailors used the smaller, shallow-draft boats to pursue Barbary
gunboats into water too shallow for the larger frigates. Commodore Preble’s use of gunboats
against the Barbary corsairs was continued by his replacement, Commodore John Rodgers, when
he arrived and took command in May 1805.
The borrowed Mediterranean gunboats proved the efficacy of the system and served as a
training ground for gunboat commanders and crews. Several of the first American gunboats,
built in 1804 with a small Congressional appropriation at Jefferson’s request, saw service in the
Mediterranean after Preble asked for additional gunboats. Jefferson was pleased with the result.
When a gunboat arrived in Washington, he wrote to Massachusetts Congressman and Republican
Jacob Crowninshield, “The gunboat here far exceeds expectation, in her sailing and is really a
fine sea-boat…We expect hourly one from Norfolk, much lighter and said to be a model of
beauty.”162 The gunboat’s success in the coastal waters of the Mediterranean convinced
Jefferson to build enough gunboats “to compel obedience in every sea-port.”163 He therefore
requested additional funds for gunboats in 1805, 1806, and 1807. As gunboats returned from the
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Mediterranean, Jefferson ordered them to major American ports as coastal defense vessels. New
York, the largest port in the United States, particularly needed protection, and Jefferson notified
Attorney General Morgan Lewis that a majority of the gunboats were “destined to be stationed at
New York as soon as they can be got there.”164
Since the end of Jefferson’s presidency in 1809, historians have attempted to explain why
Jefferson endorsed gunboats so enthusiastically. Some reduced Jefferson’s motivations to
simplistic, pithy statements like Roosevelt’s “Jefferson was anti-navy,” or Beard’s “Jefferson did
not value commerce.” The evidence suggests a more subtle answer. Gunboats were Jefferson’s
best option for naval defense under the circumstances at the time. When Jefferson’s loyalties to
his fellow Republicans, political philosophies (especially his preoccupation with republicanism),
and commitment to financial economy are considered along with the political environment that
prevailed in Europe and throughout the Atlantic region, it is clear that Jefferson could not have
constructed a European-style navy of sea-going battleships. Had Jefferson done so, he would
have compromised the trust of the Republican party, infringed on his own guiding principles,
bankrupted the U.S. government, and possibly provoked the wrath of the most powerful navy on
earth. Therefore, gunboats were not simply a reasonable choice; in Jefferson’s circumstances,
they were the only option left.
For Jefferson’s coastal defense plan to be implemented, however, Jefferson had to
convince Congress to appropriate money for gunboat construction. As shall be seen, Republican
naval policy was not as universally defined as some historians have suggested; Congressional
Republicans expressed a variety of opinions and beliefs about what sort of navy should defend
the United States and its interests abroad.

Thomas Jefferson, “From Thomas Jefferson to Morgan Lewis, 2 May 1806,” Founders Online, National
Archives, accessed April 11, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-3679.
164

46

Chapter 3
The Congressional Gunboat Appropriation Debates, 1802-1807

In the final days of his presidency, George Washington used his Farewell Address to
warn against political factions. Washington argued interparty rancor “[agitated] the community
with ill founded jealousies and false alarms” and cultivated “the animosity of one part against
another.”165 Despite Washington’s efforts, political division developed quickly in American
politics, especially between what came to be known as Federalists and Republicans. Washington
viewed the break between Federalists and Republicans with despair. Thomas Jefferson,
however, saw his election to executive office in 1800 as the first Republican President as a
second American Revolution. His party’s philosophy vindicated by the American electorate and
bent on returning the United States to its founding ideals, Jefferson made reducing the national
debt, military reform, and maintaining international neutrality cornerstones of his presidency. As
a defensive measure for the American coast that required a minimum of financial expense,
sought to avoid antagonizing the Royal Navy, and simultaneously appeased committed
antinavalists, gunboats were an important component of Jefferson’s policy. Congress, however,
was responsible for the gunboat program’s approval and funding. Therefore, a study of the
Jeffersonian gunboat plan must explore the Congressional gunboat debate. Despite the
Republican Congressional caucus’s traditional portrayal as southern agrarians universally in-line
with Jefferson and opposed to naval spending, many of the most vocal Republicans during the
gunboat debates were from northern states, and Congressional Republicans of the Seventh,
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Eighth, and Ninth Congresses held a wider range of opinions on naval and gunboat
appropriations than traditionally thought.
It is difficult to compare early American political factions to the current political
landscape. As noted by political historian Lance Banning, neither the Federalists nor the
Republicans represented the political left or right neatly as “both parties were a bit of each.”166
Federalists and Republicans did, however, represent different visions of the United States’
future, with different ideas of how the American government should function and who should
govern. Partisan sparring between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton captured in
microcosm the divide that gripped the country.
A leading disagreement was over whom should govern. Historian of the early republic
Gordon Wood wrote the Federalists, “Were strongly committed to the traditional view of society
as a hierarchy of degrees and ranks with people held together with vertical ties.”167
Consequentially many Federalists embraced a vision of a society ruled by an elite class of
wealthy and capable men via a powerful federal government. In contrast many Republicans
sought to minimize federal power. Hiram Caton, an expert on early Republican politics, argued
Republicans distrusted Federalist emphasis on a governing class in favor of “participatory
democracy.”168 Hence, Jefferson emphasized “absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the
majority,” which he called “the vital principle of republics,” in his 1801 inaugural address.169
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Differences between Federalist and Republican vision animated debate on many policy issues,
especially taxes, the federal debt, and defense.
The question of what, if any, navy the United States should build became a particularly
divisive political issue long before Jefferson’s presidency. Convinced the United States should
both have the means to defend itself against European attack and establish itself as a power
worthy of respect, many Federalists “advocate[d] military and naval preparedness.”170 Few were
more outspoken in their desire to establish an American navy than Alexander Hamilton, whose
prolific letters and articles show the naval vision of an elite Federalist. As Washington’s
Treasury Secretary, Hamilton was concerned by Barbary attacks on American shipping and
urged Washington to consider “the commencement of a Navy.”171 He was dismayed others in
Washington’s cabinet, including Jefferson, sought instead to reduce the army and navy “on
pecuniary considerations.”172 In contrast, Hamilton believed the Government should rather,
within the law as it stood at the time, “Complete the Navy to the contemplated extent—say Six
Ships of the line, Twelve frigates and twenty four Sloops of War.”173
Jefferson’s 1800 election as President disturbed Hamilton profoundly, as it represented
the triumph of a political philosophy he distrusted deeply. Thus Hamilton wrote to Rufus King,
Federalist and U.S. Minister to Great Britain, “At headquarters a most visionary theory
presides,” and predicted a country ruled by Jefferson with, “No army, no navy, no active
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commerce…these are the pernicious dreams which as far and as fast as possible will be
attempted to be realized.”174 Hamilton was so concerned he wrote James McHenry, naval
advocate and former Secretary of War, of the need for “assurances from Mr. Jefferson as the
motive of our cooperation in him.” That “the preservation and gradual increase of the navy” was
one of the conditions Hamilton set as the price of Federalist cooperation showed how much he
valued a navy compared to other military forces.175
In contrast, Jefferson and many other Republicans believed a large, European-style navy
of sea-going warships was unnecessary, overly expensive, and would involve the United States
in destructive European wars. Jefferson believed the Atlantic Ocean shielded the American
coastline from naval attack and rendered a large navy unneeded. In the event a European power
attempted to attack the American coast Jefferson was sure, “A small part only of their naval
force will ever be risked across the Atlantic.” The minimal threat of large-scale naval attack
meant the United States required only enough naval force, “To make ourselves equal to what
they may detach.”176 Jefferson distrusted European politics and sought to prevent American
involvement in European “broils” beyond trade and commerce and, as a careful watcher of
international affairs, Jefferson knew the consequences of challenging the Royal Navy’s seaborne
dominance after the preemptive destruction of the fleets of the Netherlands, Russia, and
Denmark at the Battle of Copenhagen.177
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This was particularly welcome news for fiscally conservative Republicans who strongly
opposed Federal spending on defense like North Carolina Congressman and Speaker of the
House of Representatives Nathaniel Macon. While Jefferson was granted significant power as
President, it fell to Congressional Republicans to translate the President’s policy suggestions into
bills and legislation. Debates over gunboat appropriations occurred on almost a yearly basis
during Jefferson’s administration, and resulted in a series of laws that permitted a gradually
larger fleet of coastal defense gunboats. Gunboat construction was a popular cause during the
Republican-led Seventh and Eighth Congresses, in power between March 4, 1801 and March 4,
1805.
On December 15, 1802 Jefferson conveyed his State of the Union Address to the House
of Representatives and the Senate via his secretary, Mr. Lewis.178 Overall, Jefferson was
pleased, and proclaimed the impending new year, “Finds us still blessed with peace and
friendship abroad [and] law, order, and religion, at home.”179 He used the occasion to update
Congress on the progress of his naval campaign against the Barbary States, and wrote a small
number of warships would remain in the Mediterranean to protect American interests from
Tripoli and the other Barbary states.180 Jefferson noted the coastal environment prevented the
larger, deep-draft ships in the American fleet from effectively stopping the escape of smaller
pirate vessels, and requested a number of smaller warships be built to fix the deficiency.181
On December 17, the House of Representatives convened to act upon Jefferson’s
message and requests. After a short debate, the House resolved, “That so much of the
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President’s message as refers to the warfare with, and to the relation with the other Barbary
Powers, be referred to a select Committee.”182 Massachusetts Republican William Eustis was
duly assigned to chair a committee of four other congressmen; Republicans Lucas Elmendorf
from New York, Thomas Tillinghast from Rhode Island, John Taliaferro from Virginia, and
Federalist Elias Perkins from Connecticut.183 After a week of deliberation Congressman Eustis
rose on January 25 with his committee’s report, which was ordered “to a Committee of the whole
House” on January 26.184 The House resolved, first, “That provision ought to be made, by law,
for building or purchasing four vessels of war, to carry not exceeding sixteen guns each.”
Second, the House ordered Eustis, Perkins, and Elmendorf to prepare “a bill or bills…pursuant to
the said resolution.”185 Eustis duly returned on January 28 with H.R. 23, “A Bill to Provide an
Additional Armament for the Protection of the Seamen and Commerce of the United States,”
which appropriated $96,000 for the construction of four, sixteen-gun warships “to be armed,
manned, and fitted out for the protection of the seamen and commerce of the United States, in
the Mediterranean and adjacent seas, and for other purposes, as the public service may
require.”186
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After several days of debate the House passed Eustis’s bill without amendment on
February 10, 1803.187 The bill was read in the Senate on February 11.188 On February 14,
Senator DeWitt Clinton of New York, Joseph Anderson from Tennessee, and James Jackson
from Georgia, all Republicans, received the bill in committee.189 Three days later, February 17,
Senator Clinton rose with an amendment for a further appropriation. In addition to the four
sixteen-gun sloops-of-war, Clinton added $50,000 to build up to fifteen gunboats, “To be armed,
manned, and fitted out, and employed for such purposes as…the public service may require.”190
The Senate passed the bill as amended on February 18, 1803; no debate was recorded.
Gunboats entered Congressional debate again after Jefferson’s November 8, 1804 State
of the Union. Preoccupied by war between Great Britain and Napoleon’s France, Jefferson’s
communication was muted in tone compared to his previous communications to Congress.
Nonetheless, the President reported, “The war which was lighted up in Europe a little before our
last meeting, has not yet extended its flames to other nations, nor been marked by the calamities
which sometimes stain the footsteps of war.”191 The United States maintained good relationships
with France and Great Britain, and Jefferson reiterated faith in “honest neutrality,” through
which he believed the United States would maintain mutually beneficial relationships with
European trade partners.192
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Congress passed “An Act to Provide an Additional Armament for the Protection of the
Seamen and Commerce of the United States” in February 1803, and authorized Jefferson to build
fifteen gunboats. Jefferson reported the gunboat building program was “now in a course of
execution to the extent…provided for.”193 Inspired by the performance of U.S. Navy gunboats in
the shallow waters of the Mediterranean and their use by other countries, Jefferson requested
more of the small warships to defend the American coast. He argued gunboats would enforce
American sovereignty within coastal waters and form an “obstacle to naval enterprise” against
coastal towns and cities. The gunboats would be crewed by local militia so they could easily
gather and attack enemy warships. Finally, Jefferson cited, “The economy of their maintenance
and preservation from decay when not in actual service; and the competence of our finances to
this defensive provision.”194
On November 12, the House approved Virginian John Randolph’s resolution that
Jefferson’s requests regarding, “The defence and security of our ports and harbors, and
supporting within our waters the authority of our laws” be considered by a committee chaired by
Maryland Republican Joseph Hopper Nicholson.195 Four other Republicans, Robert Brown of
Pennsylvania, Samuel Riker from New York, Ebenezer Seaver from Massachusetts, and Gideon
Odin from Vermont, with Federalists Thomas Griffen from Virginia and Samuel Hunt of New
Hampshire completed Nicholson’s committee.196
Nicholson desired to follow Jefferson’s vision as closely as possible and provide
American harbor protection, coastal defense, and law enforcement within American waters. He
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was unsure if harbor defense and law enforcement could be covered by one bill with provisions
for both or should be separate bills. He wrote to the President on November 19, 1804 and
requested Jefferson tell him, “The Number of Boats wanted, the manner in which they are to be
disposed of, how to be officered, mannd and equipt [sic]; in fine such Information as well enable
me to meet your Wishes.”197 With the British attack on Copenhagen likely in mind Jefferson
urged Nicholson to tread carefully lest his legislation “[collide] with the pride of [Great]
Britain,” and suggested, “It is better to avoid giving unnecessary umbrage where the same effect
can be produced without doing it.”198 In an effort to appear as harmless as possible to Great
Britain, Jefferson suggested the gunboats be a separate act, and “be considered merely as a
continuation of the views of the former act on the same subject.”199
Nicholson therefore introduced two bills. On November 22, 1804 Nicholson presented
“An Act for the More Effectual Preservation of Peace in the Ports and Harbors of the United
States, and in the Waters Under Their Jurisdiction,” which authorized judges to arrest and try
anyone suspected of breaking U.S. laws within American harbors and territorial waters, even
when aboard foreign warships.200 The law also ordered “any officer having command of militia,
or any officer having command of regular troops, or of armed vessels of the United States, in the
Vicinity” to assist with the arrest if needed.201 The bill was made law on March 3, 1805.
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Nicholson’s committee turned to the provision of military defense. Nicholson wrote
Jefferson again on January 28, 1805 and asked how many gunboats Jefferson sought. He also
requested advice on how the appropriations request should be presented; “Permit me also to ask
whether you think it will be better to make a detailed Report to the House,” he wrote, “or
whether a Bill making the Appropriation, and pointing to the Object, will be sufficient.”202
Jefferson provided a broad overview of his coastal defense philosophy in his January 29 reply.
His goal was not to fortify American harbors against all enemy warships, as this was impossibly
expensive. Instead Jefferson argued, “If we cannot hinder vessels from entering our harbours,
we should turn our attention to the putting it out of their power to lie…before a town to injure
it.”203 To this end, he recommended a combination of shore artillery batteries and gunboats.
Jefferson noted ten gunboats were being constructed under the 1803 authorization and cited his
belief that “15. more would enable us to put every harbour under our view into a respectable
condition;” at an estimated cost of $4,000 per gunboat, Jefferson recommended a total
appropriation of $60,000.204 Ever the shrewd politician, Jefferson counseled against sharing too
many details with the rest of Congress. If the law were limited by the amount of money
appropriated rather than the amount of gunboats to be built, “Perhaps that sum would build
more” than the expected fifteen; therefore, Jefferson suggested it would be prudent “not to give a
detailed report, which exposes our policy too much.”205
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Nicholson and his committee presented their proposal for gunboat appropriations to
Congress on January 31, 1805. “A Bill to Appropriate a Sum of Money for the Purpose of
Building Gun-Boats” incorporated Jefferson’s suggestions, and appropriated $60,000, “For the
purpose of enabling the President to cause to be built, a number of gunboats, not exceeding
twenty five, for the better protection of the ports and harbors of the United States.”206 The House
voted to debate Nicholson’s bill the following day, but did not consider the bill again until
February 7 due to other business. Nicholson’s bill passed the House without amendment on
February 8.207
Nicholson’s bill was assigned to another Marylander, Republican Senator Samuel
Smith, along with Federalist Jonathan Dayton from New Jersey and New York
Republican Samuel L. Mitchill, upon arrival at the Senate.208 The bill sailed through its
second reading without amendment; on February 28, the Senate passed the bill as
submitted following a third reading.209 “An Act to Appropriate a Sum of Money for the
Purpose of Building Gun Boats” was enacted as law on March 2, 1805.210
Historians traditionally viewed the early-nineteenth century Congressional debate on
naval appropriations as a struggle between Republican southern farmers and Federalist northern
industrialists. Charles Beard noted Jefferson’s “sympathies and affiliations were with the
agrarian class,” and even more importantly, suggested Jefferson “recognized the agricultural

U.S. Congress, “H.R. 129,” Bills and Resolutions of the House and Senate, 8th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1805).
U.S. Congress, “Thursday, February 7,” in Annals of Congress, House of Representatives, 8th Congress,
nd
2 Session, 12 November, 1804 (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1851), 1184. No record of Congressional
debate over Nicholson’s bill is recorded.
208
U.S. Congress, “Saturday, February 9,” in Annals of Congress, Senate, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, 9
February, 1804 (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1851), 53. Senator Smith’s brother, Robert Smith, was
Jefferson’s Secretary of the Navy.
209
U.S. Congress, “Thursday, February 28,” in Annals of Congress, Senate, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, 9
February, 1804 (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1851), 67.
210
U.S. Congress, “An Act to Appropriate a Sum of Money for the Purpose of Building Gun Boats,” in
United States Statutes at Large, 2 Stat., 330.
206
207

57

interest as the main body of his party.”211 Jefferson biographer Merrill Peterson added northern
merchants supported increased naval construction as protection for their shipping interests. In
contrast he argued Southern, agricultural Republicans “objected both on grounds of costly
discrimination and the inability, practically, of a national fleet to defend the long, exposed
coastline from the Chesapeake southward.”212
The first two gunboat appropriations illustrate the problems with the traditional depiction
of the gunboat debate. In contrast to Beard and Peterson’s hypothesis, none of the Congressional
committees that drafted “A Bill to Provide an Additional Armament for the Protection of the
Seamen and Commerce of the United States” in 1803 or “An Act to Appropriate a Sum of
Money for the Purpose of Building Gun Boats” in 1805 fit the traditional “Southern
Agriculturalist” model, especially with regard to the legislator’s states of origin.
Congressman Eustis’s 1802-3 House committee consisted of three northern Republicans,
and Taliaferro from Virginia. Additionally, the 1803 Senate committee was chaired by New
York Republican DeWitt Clinton, with Southerners Joseph Anderson from Tennessee and James
Jackson of Georgia. Northern states were also well represented in 1804-5. Maryland
Republicans exerted considerable influence on gunboat legislation; Congressman Nicholson
wrote the bill, and Senator Samuel Smith navigated it through the Senate. Other than Nicholson,
no other committee member hailed from below the Mason-Dixon line. In the Senate, the other
Republican senator on Smith’s committee was from New York.
Therefore, northern Republicans played a large role in shaping naval policy during
Jefferson’s administration. While Southern Republicans Taliaferro, Jackson, and Anderson sat
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on gunboat committees, they were outnumbered by northern Republican Congressmen Eustis,
Elmendorf, Tillinghast, Nicholson, Brown, Riker, Seaver, and Odin, and Senators Clinton,
Mitchill, and Smith.
Had Republicans wanted to scuttle the U.S. Navy, the committees responsible for naval
appropriations would have had ample opportunity to do so. Despite the overwhelming presence
of Republicans on all gunboat committees, however, the laws they passed granted significant
appropriations to naval construction programs. Eustis’s committee recommended $90,000 be
spent on four additional sea-going warships, and Clinton added an additional $50,000 for
gunboats. Nicholson and Smith granted another $60,0000 for gunboats in 1805, a total of
$200,000 over four years. Further, while Jefferson requested smaller craft for the U.S. fleet
deployed to the Mediterranean in 1803, he left Congress the decision of what ships to build;
therefore, Clinton’s amendment which funded fifteen gunboats originated with Congressional
Republicans, not the President. Appropriations totaling $200,000 to fund a building program of
four “blue-water” warships and up to thirty-nine coastal defense gunboats are hardly the actions
of committed enemies of the Navy.
The Seventh and Eighth Congresses passed gunboat appropriations at Jefferson’s request
with seemingly little discussion and few amendments. In contrast, gunboat legislation was
introduced twice during the Ninth Congress, in session between March 4, 1805 and March 4,
1807, and generated acrimonious debate. During the first session, Republicans generally
supported Jefferson but expressed a wider range of opinions about gunboat and naval
appropriations than in other sessions. In the second session, gunboat legislation proved
unpopular, and Congress did not approve additional money for gunboat construction.
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Jefferson shared his policy goals with Congress again in his 1805 State of the Union
message. With war between France and Great Britain becoming more widespread, Jefferson was
glad Congress had reconvened.213 While the United States remained neutral, Jefferson warned,
“The aspect of our foreign relations has considerably changed” and informed Congress, “Our
coasts have been infested, and our harbors watched, by private armed vessels…committing
piratical acts.”214 British and French warships prowled the American coast and stopped
American merchant vessels, seized cargo, and impressed sailors, “To the great annoyance and
oppression of our commerce,” even though they claimed to be in search of enemy combatants.215
While Jefferson believed diplomacy would resolve the situation, he recognized more defensive
measures were desperately needed at the coast and the United States may need to resort to war.
Therefore, Jefferson urged Congress to take prudent action in preparation for war. To “place our
seaport towns out of the danger of insult,” Jefferson suggested harbor fortifications and gunboats
be constructed.216 Jefferson also asked for money to build seventy-four-gun battleships.217
On December 4, 1805, the House assigned the President’s proposals to committees.218
While some congressmen argued the House Committee on Ways and Means should consider
Jefferson’s proposals regarding gunboats, harbor fortifications, and warships, a “select”
committee, chaired by Virginia Republican John Dawson was ultimately appointed. Six other
congressmen joined Dawson; Republicans Nathan Williams from New York, Thomas Blount
from North Carolina, James Fisk of Vermont, Ezra Darby from New Jersey, and Joseph Clay of
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Pennsylvania (who replaced John Hamilton from Pennsylvania), and Federalist William Ely of
Massachusetts.
After almost three weeks of deliberation, Dawson presented documents from Secretary of
the Navy Robert Smith that reported enough building material for six seventy-four-gun warships
was stored at shipyards on the East coast. Smith reported, “A seventy-four gun ship will cost,
$328,888.89” while, “The average cost of building gunboats, will be, each, $4,625.00.”219 Smith
also explained Congress must remember the time necessary to construct ships-of-the-line; “It
may be proper here to subjoin,” he wrote, “That, from the time Congress shall authorize the
building of seventy-four-gun ships, it will require three years to prepare one for launching; but
we could, in the same period of time, build six.”220 In light of Smith’s information, Dawson
brought three resolutions for Congress to consider. To implement Jefferson’s multi-faceted
coastal defense plan Dawson requested $150,000, “To cause our ports and harbors to be better
fortified and protected against any insult or injury” and $250,000 more for, “A number of
gunboats, not exceeding fifty, for the better protection to the harbors, coasts, and commerce, of
the United States.”221 Finally, Dawson asked for $650,000 for six line-of-battle ships of seventyfour guns each.222
When the House met a month later to debate Dawson’s resolutions, Dawson reminded his
fellow congressmen of Jefferson’s December 3 State of the Union address. He said Jefferson’s
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report of foreign predation on American commercial shipping “excited the honest indignation of
all who heard it.”223 Therefore, Dawson exhorted the House to stand with the President and
enact the legislation he sought. He argued, “It now becomes our duty…to adopt those measures,
and to provide those means, best calculated to meet the state of things.”224 During three days of
debate (January 23, 28, and March 25), concerns about cost, disagreements over the importance
of commerce, and regional interests separated House Republicans into factions which competed
for influence.
The first group was composed of Dawson and other advocates for more harbor defenses
and a stronger navy to defend maritime commerce. They viewed the proposed appropriations as
a starting point to be increased if required; in fact, Dawson stated the $150,000 for fortifications
was designed to be replaced with a larger appropriation. Nathan Williams of New York, a
member of Dawson’s committee, explained the committee’s goal was not to create a
comprehensive defense system, but rather repair previously constructed fortifications and supply
them with more artillery.225
John Jackson of Virginia agreed with Dawson and Williams, and he said it was “high
time that the representatives of the nation should deliberate on the subject” because, “The cries
of our impressed seamen join in the general murmur; our commerce, subject to lawless
condemnation under admiralty decisions, calls aloud for our attention.”226 Jackson urged
Congress to not be distracted by the amounts requested. The resolutions were to “[fix] the
principle” and allow Congress to decide to construct defensive measures or not, rather than
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determine how much to spend.227 While Congress lacked information about which harbors
would be fortified, or how many soldiers and guns were needed to man and arm them, Jackson
believed it “not necessary now to have that detailed information which it may be necessary to
have when this business assumes the shape of a bill.”228
Representative Orchard Cook took Dawson’s position a step further, and argued
Dawson’s resolutions did not provide enough fortifications, artillery batteries, and warships.
Cook, a merchant and Republican from Massachusetts, was a particularly vocal supporter of
commercial interests and increased naval spending and believed all Americans “equally entitled
to the protection of your Government.”229 He challenged his fellow Republican’s partiality to
farmers head-on; “Merchants and your mariners,” he thundered, “Are as much entitled to
protection in their pursuits, as are those whose pursuits are agricultural!”230 From his perspective
as a businessman, Cook argued that the U.S. Navy was inadequate to protect American
commerce and demanded a powerful navy like other nations. In Cook’s opinion, the United
States needed a powerful fleet of “thirty ships-of-the-line and seventy frigates.”231
Local interests also played a significant role, and as their state had the largest harbor in
the United States, New York Republicans were particularly strident in their desire for more
defenses. George Clinton, Jr. rose and called Dawson’s appropriations for harbor fortifications
“altogether inadequate,” especially for a city of New York’s size.232 The amount requested
wouldn’t complete defensive works around New York harbor alone, let alone other, additional
American ports. Therefore, Clinton announced he would “rather not appropriate a cent, than
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agree to such a sum as would be a burlesque on the subject.”233 Clinton’s fellow New York
Republican David Thomas added “granting it appeared nearly equivalent to doing nothing.”234
Instead of asking for specific dollar amounts in the resolution, Thomas suggested replacing them
with blanks so, “After principles were decided…a bill brought in to carry them to effect.”235
Dawson, in turn, argued Clinton and Thomas misstated the situation. The resolutions
were not to be the only money spent on New York fortifications, but were instead intended as a
starting point and would be augmented with additional money from other sources. Dawson
reminded his colleagues of the “one million of dollars…already been applied to the defence of
New York, provided that State agrees to appropriate the money,” and the additional “many
millions…applied to the defence of our harbors” by prior Congressional acts.236
Finally, a third group of congressmen asked for more information, and argued Congress
should not spend money on fortifications and ships without assurance the appropriations were
adequate. Few suggested halting spending on naval defense, but many expressed their caution,
or were displeased with the resolutions. Peter Early, a Republican from Georgia, was another
outspoken critic of Dawson’s resolutions and argued Congress was “not possessed of sufficient
detailed information on which to found a correct decision” especially in light of the system’s
complexity.237 Early’s caution earned Dawson’s ire; in frustration, Dawson exclaimed, “I know
of no way in which [Early] can get information, except by converting a committee of this House
into a corps of engineers, to go from one end of this country to the other!”238 Despite Dawson’s
outburst, Republican and Speaker of the House Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina agreed
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Congress did not have enough information, and thought Early’s request reasonable.239 Macon
supported the construction of gunboats and believed they were “better adapted to the defence of
our harbors than any other” defensive means.240 He also believed, however, the United States
could not afford adequate harbor fortifications or enough seventy-four-gun warships to ensure
national security as, “You must have a fleet equal to Great Britain if you expect defence in this
way.”241
Other representatives were less polite. In response to Connecticut Federalist Samuel W.
Dana’s statement scolding Congress for not protecting “the violated rights of their citizens” after
seven weeks in session, Maryland Republican Roger Nelson responded even if Congress, “Had
been in session seventy-seven weeks,” he should rather “vote against coming to a decision on
any question, however important” than vote without information in hand.242 He believed
Dawson’s appropriations for gunboats and harbor fortifications excessive, and but announced,
“If the thing can be effected by the expenditure of a moderate sum, I may agree to it.” He
warned however, “If the sum required shall be so enormous as not only to eat up our existing
revenue, but to require new burdens, I will not vote for a dollar.”243
On March 25, 1806, the House voted on Dawson’s resolutions. The appropriation of
$150,000 for harbor fortifications passed narrowly with sixty-three in favor and sixty against.244
Dawson unsuccessfully attempted to amend the second resolution and replace the $250,000
requested for gunboats with a blank, “With the view of filling it with a larger sum in case the
third resolution should be disagreed to.” His concern was misplaced, and the gunboat resolution
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passed with seventy-two votes in favor.245 The third appropriation of $660,000 for six seventyfour-gun warships encountered last-minute debate. Most Republicans were willing to build
gunboats, but seagoing warships were still unpopular. Despite the support of New York
Republican Josiah Masters, who argued, “The Government ought to protect and encourage the
merchant to pursue his own lawful interest, according to his own judgement,” the measure failed
with only thirty votes in favor.246
Congress duly ordered Dawson’s committee was to draft, “A bill, or bills…pursuant to
the first and second of the said resolutions.”247 On March 28, 1806 Dawson produced “A Bill for
Fortifying the Ports and Harbors of the United States, and for Building Gunboats,” which was
debated by the House April 16 and 18, 1806. Republicans attempted to alter the bill several
times at the last minute. The $150,000 appropriation for harbor fortifications endured two
motions which called for it to be deleted, the first by David R. Williams, Republican from South
Carolina, and the second by Joseph Clay, Republican from Pennsylvania and a member of
Dawson’s original committee.248 Both were voted down. Other Republicans attempted to add
appropriations for additional warships to the bill. Maryland Republican William McCreery
reminded his colleagues of the revenue maritime commerce earned and argued European war
and, “The great and growing importance of our commerce, and the defenseless state it is in”
should induce Congress to spend more on defense. 249 He therefore moved to add an
appropriation of $500,000 for three additional frigates to the bill. Dawson supported McCreery’s
motion, especially since the recent loss of several frigates had created a “deficiency in the Naval
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Establishment;” therefore, Dawson “offered a new section appropriating a sum not exceeding
$500,000, to enable the President to cause three additional frigates to be built.”250 Kentucky
Republican Matthew Lyon agreed American commercial shipping required protection, and
suggested an additional amendment, “To enable the President to cause three additional frigates or
two seventy-fours to be built.”251 Both amendments were voted down.
“A Bill for Fortifying the Ports and Harbors of the United States, and for Building
Gunboats” passed on April 16, 1806. Upon arrival in the Senate, “The bill was read the first and
second time by unanimous consent,” ordered to a third reading, and assigned to Senator Uriah
Tracy’s committee for review.252 Tracy, a Connecticut Federalist, was joined by two Republican
Senators experienced in gunboat appropriations. Joseph Anderson of Tennessee had been a
member of DeWitt Clinton’s 1803 committee, and Samuel L. Mitchill from New York had sat on
Samuel Smith’s 1805 committee.253 Tracy’s committee submitted an amendment on April 18,
1806 that authorized the President, “To officer, man and equip any part, or all of said gun boats”
and appropriated an additional $20,000, “To defray any expense which may be incurred by
officering, manning and equipping gun boats.”254 The bill passed the Senate on April 18 and
went into effect April 21, 1806.255
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The Ninth Congress considered gunboats again during the second session. In his
December 2, 1806 State of the Union message Jefferson reported construction of the gunboats
authorized in 1805 was proceeding on schedule. Despite minor delays, “To allow the time
necessary for their more solid construction,” Jefferson announced the small warships would be
ready for service in the spring.256 In light of the increased tensions between Great Britain and the
United States, however, Jefferson wanted more gunboats, “To place our seaport towns and
waters in that state of defence to which we are competent.”257 Therefore Jefferson requested
another appropriation for gunboats with additional money for, “Repairing fortifications already
established, and the erection of such other works as may have real effect in obstructing the
approach of an enemy to our seaport towns, or their remaining before them.”258 Following
Jefferson’s message, Maryland Republican Roger Nelson was assigned the question of how best
to protect the harbors and coastline of the United States, with Republicans Philip R. Thompson
of Virginia, John Rea of Pennsylvania, David Thomas of New York, and Thomas Wynns from
North Carolina, and Federalists Benjamin Tallmadge of Connecticut and James Elliot of
Vermont.259
Previous Congresses allowed committee chairs to return with legislation prior to debate,
and committee members generally refrained from addressing Congress before the committee
chair. Due to recent events the second session did not follow earlier precedent. The previous
April, while ostensibly in search of two French warships off Sandy Hook, New Jersey, a
squadron of Royal Navy frigates began to stop and search merchant vessels. On April 25, 1806,
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HMS Leander, commanded by Captains William Lyall and Henry Whitby, killed an American
sailor named John Pierce with a misplaced warning shot, and caused riots in New York.260
Several British officers caught ashore were imprisoned briefly for their own safety before they
could be smuggled back to their ships.
On December 15, unable to contain his anger over “The Leander Affair” any longer,
Vermont Federalist James Elliot rose to address Congress. Elliot announced he was sure “but
one sentiment has pervaded and agitated the American mind” regarding “the atrocious murder of
our fellow citizen, John Pierce, while in the peaceable pursuit of his honest occupation.”261
Elliot argued the U.S. Navy was entirely inadequate against British aggression, and asked
Congress to consider whether it would not be prudent, “To augment, in some small degree, that
establishment,” or to “organize and manage it in a different manner from what has been
heretofore practiced; to give it more efficiency and more energy?”262 Finally, Elliot reminded
his colleagues Congress was responsible for adequate funding for defensive measures, and
decried “the miserly but convulsive grasp” with which they held “the purse-strings of the
nation.”263
Despite Elliot’s efforts, Nelson did not produce resolutions until January 12, 1807. As in
the previous session, Nelson’s resolutions sought appropriations to repair and improve existing
harbor fortifications, and to build additional gunboats.264 Nelson evidently learned from
Dawson’s experience; rather than include suggested appropriation sums, his resolutions included
blanks to be filled-in after the resolutions were passed. To bolster his case and show Congress
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how much money was needed, Nelson submitted several letters from Secretary of the Navy
Robert Smith. Smith reported thirteen gunboats and four bomb vessels in service and fifty-six
gunboats under construction.265 Smith also wrote he had been instructed, by President Jefferson,
no less, to request $300,000 to build an additional sixty gunboats.266
The House of Representatives debated Nelson’s bill intermittently between January 23
and February 24, 1807. Gurdon S. Mumford, a Republican from New York, argued the U.S.
Navy must be allowed to defend the American coastline, especially in the wake of the Leander
Affair. He therefore moved to amend Nelson’s first resolution so to, “Enable the President of the
United States to equip, man, and maintain so much of the present naval force of the United States
as he may judge proper.”267 He asked if Congress would allow, “The humiliating degradation of
having its own citizens murdered within its own limits, without making an effort and taking such
strong ground as will prevent in future the repetition of the like crimes?”268 George Clinton, Jr.,
Mumford’s fellow New York Republican, supported the amendment despite his distaste for
“expensive navies or standing armies.” Nevertheless, Clinton said, “If we must have a navy—
small as it is—let us employ it for its true design.”269 Nelson wasn’t opposed to Mumford’s
amendment, but suggested it would fit better in the gunboat resolution. Despite Nelson’s
support, the amendment failed forty-six to fifty.270
Harbor fortifications caused vigorous debate and divided the Republican caucus again.
One faction argued the appropriation for coastal fortifications should be higher. In contrast,
Nelson and his supporters claimed fortifications were unable to adequately defend ports from
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naval attack and supported a smaller appropriation. Massachusetts Republican Orchard Cook
suggested the largest appropriation when he moved one-million-dollars be spent on fortifications.
His motion was immediately voted down with only twelve votes in favor.271
Debate focused on New York despite Nelson’s intention to provide fortifications at
several American harbors. New York Republicans again supported a larger appropriation.
Mumford proposed an appropriation of $500,000 because he was unaware “of any nation in the
annals of history that ever neglected to protect their ports and harbors, especially when in a
similar defenceless situation we now find our own.”272 Republican Uri Tracy, also from New
York, supported Mumford’s motion of $500,000 and called for “some amendment…by which
the President will be enabled to arm, equip, and keep in actual service, if necessary, all the
gunboats and frigates.”273 His request for one million dollars dismissed, Orchard Cook also
supported Mumford’s idea, and called for Congress to “fill the blank with a liberal sum—with
the sum of $500,000.”274 Matthew Lyon, a Republican from landlocked Kentucky, also threw
his support behind “a liberal appropriation” for harbor defense.275
In contrast, other representatives doubted the utility of fortifications and opposed large
appropriations for their construction. Nelson proposed a mere $20,000 against Mumford and
Tracy’s calls for $500,000. Nelson reported the Department of War had no need of additional
money for harbor fortifications, as $110,000 remained of the $150,000 appropriated the year
before and was more than could be spent in a year.276 Further, Nelson believed, “Ten millions of
dollars would not make [New York] invulnerable to the attack of eight or ten ships-of-the-
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line.”277 Therefore, Nelson believed Mumford’s proposed $500,000 appropriation impractical
and inadequate.
Finally, Nelson reminded his colleagues of European countries that spent vast sums on
port fortifications only to condemn their own people to poverty. He concluded, “Rather than see
the people of this country placed in the same calamitous condition, I would prefer beholding all
the towns in the United States prostrate!”278 John Smilie, a Pennsylvania Republican, agreed.
Despite the Leander Affair, Smilie believed the United States was “not at present threatened with
war,” and reminded Congress of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain.279
Convinced the United States was not in danger, Smilie believed it “unwise to arrest the discharge
of the national debt, and apply large funds to this object, without any evidence of its utility.”280
His blasé attitude toward national defence horrified more militant colleagues like Nathan
Williams of New York, who exclaimed, “From the course the business before us has taken, sir, I
apprehend that we shall never rise into action, until roused by some dreadful disaster!”281
Nonetheless, Smilie believed, “Money granted for the fortifications of ports on the present plan
would be so much money thrown away.”282 Opinions were so divided, motions and
countermotions took the form of a bidding war over the amount to be earmarked for harbor
defense. The Annals of Congress record:
[Mumford’s motion for $500,000] was disagreed to—39 to 65. Mr. Mumford
then moved to fill the blank with ‘$400,000.’ This motion was disagreed to—37
to 66. Mr. Mumford then proposed ‘$300,000’—Disagreed to, ayes 36, noes 58.
Mr. Cook proposed ‘$250,000’…The question was then taken on filling the blank
with ‘250,000,’ which was disagreed to—ayes 37, noes 69.283
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Ultimately, Nelson’s original appropriation of $20,000 was adopted with fifty-seven
votes in favor.284
The gunboat resolution also caused strenuous debate. Unlike prior gunboat
appropriations, which were generally popular and passed easily, gunboats were decidedly less
popular during the second session of the Ninth Congress. House Republicans divided into a progunboat faction and a harbor fortification faction. Roger Nelson led the pro-gunboat faction and
supported Jefferson and Smith’s request for $300,000 to build sixty gunboats. Not an expert in
naval affairs—he confessed himself “wholly ignorant of the utility of gunboats”—Nelson
argued, “If gunboats are built, we ought to build enough to answer the purpose intended…the
proper department has informed us that $300,000 will be necessary for the purpose.”285
Republican Philip Van Cortlandt of New York supported Nelson’s cause because he
doubted harbor fortifications were sufficient defense against naval attack. Rather, he noted the
U.S. Navy “had a number of vessels of war, which he thought might be advantageously used as
circumstances might require.”286 He suggested $300,000 be appropriated and proposed to “let
the President use it as he pleases, either in gunboats or fortifications.”287 Tennessee Republican
George W. Campbell concurred; “As he understood the subject,” he stated, “Gunboats were
intended to supply the deficiency existing in other fortifications [as]…some of our ports could
not be defended by batteries.”288 James Fisk, a Vermont Republican, supported gunboats
because of lessons learned during the First Barbary War. He reminded Congress the U.S. fleet,
“Had been obliged to borrow a number of [gunboats], which had proved not only an instrument
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of defence, but likewise of offence” in the shallow waters off the Tripoline coast.289 He believed
the gunboats “to be peculiarly adapted to the United States, who had a large extent of seacoast
and numbers of shoals, enabling them to act with effect.”290 Rhode Island Republican Joseph
Stanton, Jr. also appealed to history, and recalled, “In the last French war, a system of this kind
had been adopted.” He understood, “In a calm, two gunboats would sink a frigate.”291
In contrast, anti-gunboat congressmen argued harbor fortifications were better for defense
and the Navy did not need more gunboats. New York Representative Mumford believed
gunboats, “Inadequate to any useful purpose of defence in the Northern States, where the waters
are rough.”292 During debate on February 5, 1807, he hoped the House would “agree to strike
out the whole resolution respecting gunboats, with a view to appropriate that money to solid and
durable fortifications;” in the first storm, he pessimistically predicted gunboats would “sink at
their mooring at the entrance of either of the harbors of Portsmouth, Salem, Plymouth, Newport,
or New York.”293
Others argued gunboats were unproven or too experimental to trust. Republican Edward
Lloyd of Maryland flatly opposed spending more money on gunboats, in his opinion, “An
experiment not yet tried.” He believed the sixty already funded, “Are a sufficient number with
which to try the experiment. Let us first determine their utility before we appropriate large sums
of money.”294 Virginia Republican John Randolph agreed. He called gunboats a “matter of
experiment,” and warned, “If they should eventually turn out good for nothing, the House would
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be of opinion that they had vested as large a capital in a worthless project as would be deemed
necessary.”295
Because the United States and Great Britain were at peace, several Republicans believed
preparation for war unnecessary. Republican Andrew Gregg of Pennsylvania asked his
colleagues, “What reason, then, is there for apprehending a greater danger at this period than
existed several years ago?”296 Not only did Gregg’s fellow Pennsylvanian, Congressman Smilie,
agree, he thought gunboats would push the United States toward war. Smilie argued had
gunboats been on hand during the Leander Affair, they would have precipitated war with Great
Britain by firing back.297 Smilie later changed his mind. On February 5 he announced his
support for the gunboat appropriation, and told Congress, “Whether the President or the
Secretary of the Navy was competent to a correct decision on this point, he did not know…He
did know, however, that it was [Congress’s] duty to provide the necessary means.”298
After several days of debate, the House was at an impasse and could not agree on how
much money to provide for gunboat construction. House leadership brokered a compromise to
break the deadlock; first, the House ordered Republican David Thomas of New York and a small
committee to produce, “A bill, or bills…pursuant to the first of the said resolutions” for harbor
fortification construction and repair.299 Second, the House adopted Georgia Republican Peter
Early’s resolution that Jefferson be asked to defend “the efficacy of gunboats in the protection
and defence of ports and harbors.”300
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Jefferson’s replied on February 10, 1807. “In compliance with the House of
Representatives,” wrote Jefferson, “I proceed to give such information as is possessed of the
effect of gunboats in the protection and defense of harbors, of the numbers thought necessary,
and of the proposed distribution of them among the ports and harbors of the United States.”301
Once again, Jefferson described his multi-part coastal defense plan of fortified artillery, mobile
artillery batteries, and gunboats, integrated for the better defense of towns and harbors.302
Jefferson also defended the efficacy of gunboats, and cited their use in the Mediterranean during
the First Barbary War, by the British in various actions around Gibraltar, and by the Russian fleet
commanded by John Paul Jones at the Battle of the Liman.303 Finally, Jefferson suggested the
gunboats be distributed along the American coastline; he planned to deploy fifty at New York,
fifty more to Boston and Cape Cod, twenty to the Chesapeake bay, twenty-five to Savannah and
Charleston, fifteen to the Delaware Bay, and forty to the Mississippi delta.304
Following Jefferson’s answer, debate over harbor fortifications and gunboats resumed on
February 21. The end of the second session approached quickly, and Congress appeared infused
with purpose. When David Thomas presented a harbor fortification bill, Virginia Republican
Thomas Newton, Jr. moved to increase the appropriation to $150,000.305 The measure passed,
yeas fifty-six, nays forty-seven. With harbor fortifications funded, Thomas amended his bill to
appropriate $150,000 more for thirty gunboats. Against Congressman Williams’s argument that
the United States had enough gunboats, the amendment passed, yeas sixty-eight, nays thirty-
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six.306 “An act making further appropriations for fortifying the ports and harbors of the United
States, and for building gunboats” passed by the House and was transmitted to the Senate on
February 24 with eight days remaining in the session.307
Vermont Senator and Republican Stephen R. Bradley and his committee, Pennsylvania
Republican Samuel Maclay and Connecticut Federalist Uriah Tracy, reviewed the bill.308
Bradley’s committee struck Newton’s $150,000 for harbor fortifications and reverted to Nelson’s
original $20,000 appropriation. They also deleted the $150,000 appropriation for thirty gunboats
from the bill entirely.309 On March 3, the second session’s final day, “An act making further
appropriations for fortifying the ports and harbors of the United States” passed the Senate. The
House narrowly approved the bill as amended, “By a majority of three—ayes 39, noes 36.”310
Jefferson’s 1805 requests for naval appropriations prove again Jefferson’s opinion of the
Navy was more positive than usually suggested. Jefferson’s writings show he distrusted a
European style navy, and worried the American navy would both antagonize Great Britain and
involve the United States in European conflicts. Despite his concerns, Jefferson’s December 3,
1804 State of the Union message showed he was not opposed to using naval force if necessary.
As tensions with Great Britain increased, not only did Jefferson request money for harbor
defenses and gunboats, but also for ships-of-the-line.
Congressional Republicans once again did not show the antinavalism some historians
have accused them of. The Republican-controlled House of Representatives and Senate
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ultimately passed a two-part coastal defense plan, and granted $420,000 in total appropriations
for coastal fortifications, and gunboat construction, crews, and maintenance. Further, northern
Republicans were the most vocal supporters of increased naval and defensive construction. The
Republicans were not primarily southern, nor were the Republicans as single-minded with regard
to policy as previously suggested. Republicans held opinions about the U.S. Navy and gunboats
that ranged from traditionally cited anti-navalism to manifestly pro-naval beliefs. Several
Republicans used Federalist arguments in favor of increased naval appropriations; others were
even willing to authorize sea-going, seventy-four-gun warships. While gunboats were popular
during the first session of the Ninth Congress, the anti-naval faction retained enough power to
sink proposed appropriations for larger warships.
In contrast, by the second session of the Ninth Congress gunboats lost popularity.
Republicans still controlled Congress, but most did not favor constructing more gunboats.
Gunboats were seen as wasteful, ineffective, and a poor substitute for harbor fortifications. The
disappointing failure of Nelson’s 1807 “An act making further appropriations for fortifying the
ports and harbors of the United States, and for building gunboats” demonstrated that by 1807
Jefferson’s hold was slipping on his fellow Republicans. It also demonstrated northern
Republican voices, who did not believe gunboats were an effective weapon for northern ports,
were effectively in control of naval policy at the time.
The diversity of opinions expressed within the Republican caucus during the Seventh,
Eighth, and Ninth Congresses and the prominence of northern Republicans in naval debates
show no monolithic Republican naval philosophy existed. However, a national emergency that
occurred in 1807 after Congress went into recess united congressional Republicans behind
Jefferson’s naval policy once again.
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Chapter 4
“They Must Have Recourse to Gunboats:” The Gunboat Debate in the Tenth Congress

Unexpected national emergencies have exerted a galvanizing effect on American politics
throughout U.S. history. The bombardment of Fort Sumter caused President Lincoln’s call for
volunteers and led to the American Civil War. In more recent memory the bombing of the U.S.
Navy destroyer USS Cole on October 12, 2000 unified the country and launched a Federal
investigation into its causes. Not long after, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington,
D.C. on September 11, 2001 had a similar effect. Several acts of legislation passed with
overwhelming bipartisan support in the wake of September 11 including “An Act to Deter and
Punish Terrorist Acts in the United States and Around the World, to Enhance Law Enforcement
Investigatory Tools, and for Other Purposes,” commonly called the “USA Patriot Act.” During
Jefferson’s presidency the attack on the American frigate USS Chesapeake by the British shipof-war HMS Leopard had a similar unifying effect. While it was not the first British attack on
an American ship during peacetime—HMS Leander had killed an American sailor while
attempting to stop a merchant vessel off New York Harbor in 1806, and American seamen were
frequently impressed into the Royal Navy from the decks of their merchant ships—it infuriated
the American general population and the U.S. Government. The attack also led to the final
gunboat debate of Jefferson’s presidency during the Tenth Congress’s first session. Previous
debates were framed as preparation for potential attacks on the American coast. In contrast, the
1807 gunboat appropriation debate was instigated by British aggression and showed the potential
for unification caused by national emergency, the decrease in influence enjoyed by Northeastern
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congressional Republicans, and resulted in the largest appropriation for gunboat construction
passed by Congress.
On June 22, 1807, the USS Chesapeake weighed anchor in Hampton Roads, Virginia at
the start of a long voyage to the Mediterranean. Commanded by Commodore James Barron and
crewed by three-hundred and seventy men and boys, the Chesapeake mounted thirty-eight
cannon and was one of the original six frigates built by the U.S. Navy in 1794.
As the Chesapeake sailed toward the outlet of the Chesapeake Bay, she was seen by a
British naval squadron anchored at Lynnhaven Bay, near Norfolk. The Royal Navy maintained a
strong presence off the Virginia coast and frequently resupplied their warships in Virginia ports.
Before Chesapeake sailed, British officers accused four men of her crew of deserting from
British warships in the previous year. At Barron’s court martial, witnesses testified Barron was
aware the men in question were aboard his ship, but as the crewmen had “not been ordered to be
delivered up” they were still aboard when the Chesapeake left port.311 From various of the
Royal Navy officers ashore in Virginia ports, Barron learned that the captain of HMS Malampus
intended to “take these men from the Chesapeake.”312 Despite these risks, Barron only drilled
the crew on handling the ship’s artillery battery twice prior to leaving port, and kept the ship’s
guns and munitions stowed.
Barron and his officers noticed the British warships signal each other, then saw the
British fifty-gun frigate HMS Leopard haul up her anchor and sail towards the ocean. Barron
was evidently unconcerned, “There was not any vessel in sight, or any other object to induce her
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to go to sea, but the Chesapeake.”313 As the Leopard approached the Chesapeake, she took a
tactically advantageous position upwind with the covers, or tompions, removed from her guns
and her crew at battle stations. This was suspicious behavior. Witnesses at Barron’s court
martial testified they should have “induced Commodore Barron to have prepared his ship for
action.”314
Barron did not send his men to quarters, however, and let the Leopard to come alongside.
Leopard’s commander, Captain Salusbury Pierce Humphreys, demanded Barron allow his ship
to be searched for British deserters. When Barron refused, Humphreys threatened to fire into the
Chesapeake and fired a warning shot across her bow.315 When that did not produce the required
effect, Humphreys fired three broadsides into the American frigate. Three sailors were killed,
and eighteen, including Barron, were wounded.316 The Chesapeake, totally unprepared for
action, fired only once in reply; Barron was forced to surrender, and allowed the British to
retrieve the four men.317 After the Leopard sailed back to Lynnhaven Bay, Barron’s crew
performed emergency repairs on their ship and limped home to Hampton Roads.
The American population was enraged. William H. Cabell, Governor of Virginia, wrote
Jefferson to inform him of what happened and request assistance. “Indignant as the Executive of
Virginia feel on this occasion,” he wrote, “It is certainly a Subject to which…their limited
powers do not extend.”318 Jefferson responded Congress would have to decide whether to
declare war or not but, “We may however exercise the powers entrusted to us for preventing
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future insults within our harbours.”319 With the cooperation of Governor Cabell, the Virginia
militia was activated, and the sixteen gunboats (several still under construction) in the vicinity of
Hampton Roads and Norfolk were ordered manned and readied for service under the command
of Captain Stephen Decatur.320 Jefferson directed “all armed vessels bearing commissions under
the Government of Great Britain now within the harbors or waters of the United States” to leave
American territorial waters immediately, and further ordered American citizens to not provide
provisions or equipment for British warships.321 On the diplomatic front, Jefferson dispatched a
formal complaint to Great Britain via ship.322
Jefferson firmly believed in separation of powers. He understood that while the president
was empowered to take short-term actions Congress was responsible for approving defense
appropriations and declaring war. Congress was in recess. Due to the “great and weighty
matters” under consideration, Jefferson called Congress back for a special session to “consult
and determine on such measures as in their wisdom may be deemed meet for the welfare of the
United States.”323 Jefferson believed the Leopard-Chesapeake affair demonstrated the need for
more gunboats and harbor fortifications, but was unsure if Congress would approve further
appropriations. After Congress’s rejection of his last request for gunboats, Jefferson was
concerned “it would not be respectful in me even to suggest it again.” He hoped, however, if
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Congress did indeed provide funds the gunboats could be built, and harbor fortifications
constructed or improved during the winter.324
Jefferson presented his view of the situation that faced the United States and what he
thought should be done in his October 27 Annual Message to Congress. Jefferson warned, “The
love of peace, so much cherished in the bosoms of our citizens…may not ensure our continuance
in the quiet pursuits of industry,” and suggested after Great Britain’s continued attacks Congress
should prepare for conflict.325 The President reported the money for harbor fortifications
previously appropriated and gunboats had been concentrated in New York, New Orleans,
Charleston, and the Chesapeake Bay, locations judged more “immediately in danger;” other
harbors were left “to the provisions of the present session.”326 Jefferson asked Congress to
consider two questions with regard to gunboats; first, whether more gunboats should be built,
and second, if the gunboats should be crewed by “the seamen of the United States…formed into
a special militia,” or by the standing, land-based militia of the area.327
Both houses of Congress responded urgently to Jefferson’s requests. In the Senate, New
York Republican Samuel L. Mitchill and a committee consisting of three other Republicans
(Samuel Smith of Maryland, John Milledge from Georgia, and Joseph Anderson of Kentucky)
and Federalist John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts considered “the defence of our seaport
towns and harbors, and the further provisions to be made for their security.”328 Meanwhile, the
House of Representatives assigned prominent North Carolina Republican Thomas Blount with

Thomas Jefferson, “From Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Smith, 30 July 1807,” in Founders Online,
National Archives, accessed April 11, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-6069.
325
U.S. Congress, “Tuesday, October 27: President’s Annual Message,” in Annals of Congress, Senate, 10th
Congress, 1st Session, 27 October, 1807 (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1851), 15.
326
Annals of Congress, Senate, 10th Cong., 1st Sess., 27 October, 1807, 17.
327
Ibid.
328
U.S. Congress, “Wednesday, October 28,” in Annals of Congress, Senate, 10th Congress, 1st Session, 28
October, 1807 (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1851), 19.
324

83

Republicans John Chandler of Massachusetts, Virginian William A. Burwell, Samuel Riker from
New York, George M. Troup of Georgia, and James Witherell of Vermont, and Maryland
Federalist Charles Goldsborough to examine, “Aggressions committed within our ports and
waters by foreign armed vessels, [and] the violations of our jurisdiction” and to report “the
measures necessary” to prevent them in the future.329
Despite significant support in Congress for Jefferson’s requests following the attack upon
the Chesapeake, House Republicans did not universally support naval appropriations. Some
questioned whether the materials in storage which Jefferson mentioned were earmarked
exclusively for gunboat construction, or whether they could be used to build ships-of-the-line.
Others, like Virginia Republican John Randolph, questioned whether the United States should
have a navy at all, especially when the service “had proved only a conductor of dishonor to the
nation” during the most recent attack330 Nonetheless, most were quick to praise Jefferson’s
decision to lay aside building materials and other military stores in the wake of the Chesapeake
incident. Maryland representative and Republican John Montgomery argued Jefferson was
prudent to prepare, and if the diplomatic situation between Great Britain and the United States
resolved peacefully without the need for additional gunboats, “The material would still be on
hand for the use of the Navy.”331 According to Montgomery, the eventual use of the stored
wood was less important than the need for Congress to act with firm resolution; he reminded his
colleagues funding the Navy for the next year was the first defensive measure before Congress
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since the Leopard attacked the Chesapeake, and warned, “If we give this measure a quibbling,
quirking, or reluctant affirmative, the people will be disappointed in their hopes.”332
On November 17, Congressman Blount stood to report his committee’s resolution
regarding the attack on the Chesapeake. Blount stated his committee believed the incident an
insult “of which there is scarcely to be found a parallel in the history of civilized nations.”333
Blount argued British indiscretions against American ships demonstrated the Royal Navy’s
disdain for American law and were grounds for military retaliation. Finally, after he asked for
the House’s continued patience as his committee considered how best to respond, Blout
submitted a resolution which condemned the Leopard’s attack. The resolution called the attack
on the Chesapeake as well as the British squadron’s refusal to leave the American coastline after
ordered to do so by the President, “A flagrant violation of the jurisdiction of the United
States.”334
On November 24 Blount stood with his committee’s conclusions. After extended
discussion and consideration, the committee determined land-based artillery emplacements and
fortifications supplemented by gunboats were the most effective means of coastal defense
available to the United States.335 Essentially, Blount’s committee proposed to enact Jefferson’s
multi-part coastal defense strategy, rather than follow previous precedent and approve only
harbor fortifications or gunboats. Blount proposed two resolutions; first, Congress allow the
President to build enough harbor fortifications and gunboats to “afford effectual protection to our
ports and harbors.”336 Second, an appropriation to build another lot of gunboats and
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Congressional approval for the President to “arm, equip, man, fit, and employ” them in defense
of American harbors.337 On November 30, Blount presented letters from Secretary of the Navy
Smith which suggested one hundred eighty-eight additional gunboats be built, which Smith
projected could be constructed within four months of an appropriation.338 Additionally, Blount
reported the Jefferson administration sought $300,000 if the United States remained at peace or
$750,000 if war was declared to “complete the fortifications already established and to erect
others.”339
New York representative Josiah Masters argued the amount of money requested was
inadequate to defend American harbors. In a fiery speech from the floor, Masters suggested an
appropriation of $1,500,000 for fortifications, over the objections of Massachusetts Republican
Orchard Cook who wanted more information about what defenses were needed.340 Masters
thought even his proposal “too small to fortify, efficiently, our extended seacoast.”341 He further
argued the whole policy of defensive fortifications and gunboats “ought to be abandoned;” while
he believed gunboats to be a good secondary defense, he called for of larger ships-of-the-line, a
position he thought other Republicans might find “heretical.”342 In response, Republican John
Smilie of Pennsylvania argued while the House could never appropriate enough money for
harbor defense to satisfy Masters, he supported calls to defend New York and noted while
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Congress may contain diverse opinions on how much to spend, “there was not a man in the
House who was not willing to prepare for defence.”343
Blount and Masters ultimately withdrew their suggestions for appropriation amounts and
left blanks pending further debate. While debate over Blount’s resolutions shared similarities
with previous gunboat and harbor fortification debates, especially from northern Republicans,
representatives seemed united by the need to act after the Chesapeake attack. Unlike previous
debates, representatives differed on how much to appropriate, rather than if appropriations
should be made. When the House voted on Blount’s resolutions, they passed with overwhelming
support; the first resolution was passed “without division,” and the second with ninety-three
votes in favor.344 Blount was accordingly ordered to present, “A bill or bills…pursuant to the
said resolutions.”345
Blount worked quickly and returned on December 1 with “An act for fortifying the ports
and harbors of the United States, and for building gunboats.” The Act echoed his previous
resolutions; the first section directed Federal money be appropriated, “To cause the fortifications
heretofore built or commenced, to be repaired or completed, and such others to be erected as
well, with the assistance of gunboats, [to] afford effectual protection to our ports and
harbours.”346 The second provided money to build and operate additional gunboats.347 After two
readings, Blount’s bill was sent to the House for consideration, and scheduled for debate on
December 7.
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In the Senate, Senator Mitchill pushed forward relentlessly. On November 16 he
informed his colleagues he did not intend to “dispute the empire of the high seas” by the
construction of a first-rate fleet, but merely to defend American harbors and ports.348 However,
he also stated he rejected the Jeffersonian belief American neutrality would prevent Great Britain
from perpetrating further attacks on American shipping or territories. He reminded the Senate
of, “The invasion of Zealand, the capitulation of Copenhagen, and the capture of the Danish
fleet” which proved Great Britain did not respect the “moderation, prudence, and forbearance” of
neutral powers.349 Only four days later, Mitchill produced a bill to empower the President to
build and “equip, arm, man, fit out, and employ” another contingent of gunboats for harbor
defense, and for “such other purposes…as the public service may require.”350 Mitchell pushed
his bill through the Senate quickly. After a second reading on November 25, the Senate debated
the bill’s merits December 2 and 3.351 The bill passed the Senate on December 3, was named
“An act to appropriate money for the construction of an additional number of gunboats,” and was
sent to the House of Representatives.352
During previous gunboat debates, gunboat legislation typically started in the House and
was sent to the Senate for consideration. During the Tenth Congress, Senator Mitchill’s gunboat
appropriation bill and Congressman Blount’s bill arrived in the House for consideration at
virtually the same time. The House decided to debate the merits of both bills at the same time;

U.S. Congress, “Monday, November 16: National Defence,” in Annals of Congress, Senate, 10th
Congress, 1 Session, 16 November, 1807 (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1851), 28.
349
Annals of Congress, Senate, 10th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 November, 1807, 28.
350
U.S. Congress, “Friday, November 20,” in Annals of Congress, Senate, 10th Congress, 1st Session, 20
November, 1807 (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1851), 33.
351
U.S. Congress, “Wednesday, December 2,” in Annals of Congress, Senate, 10th Congress, 1st Session, 2
December, 1807 (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1851), 44.
352
U.S. Congress, “Thursday, December 3,” in Annals of Congress, Senate, 10th Congress, 1st Session, 3
December, 1807 (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1851), 45. The Annals of Congress do not record the Senate
debate on Mitchell’s bill.
348

st

88

while most members of the House agreed further defensive measures were needed, debate
crystalized between pro-gunboat representatives and representatives who wished defense by
other means, especially ships-of-the line. Both sides included Republicans.
A small but vocal minority of Republican representatives proposed to build warships or
fortifications. They echoed the arguments of strongly pro-naval Federalists such as William
Milnor of Pennsylvania, who moved the number of gunboats to be built reduced from one
hundred eighty-eight to one hundred, and the surplus money used to construct “a few frigates…
in addition to those now in our possession.”353 Milnor’s amendment was defeated with only
twenty-one votes in favor, but New York Republican Josiah Masters also stated he would rather
construct warships or fortifications opposite New York than build the full number of gunboats.354
Republicans Daniel Durrell and Francis Gardner, both of New Hampshire, agreed; “As many
gunboats should be employed as was sufficient for defence in those waters where they might be
useful,” Gardner argued, yet “[I do] not think they would be efficient in the Northern and Eastern
ports of the United States.”355 While Durrell stated he was not opposed to gunboats, he also
feared they were unable to protect American harbors. Both suggested the funds be allocated for
other means of defense, in Durrell’s opinion, “Ships of war of some magnitude.”356
His merchant constituents likely in mind, Republican representative from Massachusetts
Orchard Cook criticized the gunboat bill because it did not protect American commercial
shipping. He argued Congress did not value commerce, and stated his fellow representatives,
“Wished the people of the United States were in the isolated situation of the Chinese, mere
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receivers of trade.”357 In reference to Masters, Durrell, and Gardner’s proposals, Cook asked
why Congress would prevent Northeastern states from defending their harbors and commerce
with warships and instead force them to adopt gunboats. Republican James Holland of North
Carolina immediately took Cook to task. Holland argued Cook had “mistaken the object of
gunboats” as, “They were not intended for protection of our commerce at sea, but for the
protection of our ports and harbors.”358
Pro-gunboat advocates argued gunboats should be funded and were a valuable part of the
American coastal defense strategy because they were cheaper and easier to construct than
frigates and ships-of-the-line. Blount stated one hundred eighty-eight additional gunboats, at a
projected cost of $852,500, would make the number of American gunboats in service two
hundred and fifty-seven as requested by Smith and Jefferson. He rejected Milnor’s assertion he
was pandering to Jefferson’s interest in gunboats by suggesting an appropriation for their
construction. Rather, Blount argued his committee was informed “this number [of gunboats]
would be necessary” for the “effectual protection” of the American coast.359
Republican William A. Burwell of Virginia, “Thought a sufficient number should at once
be authorized,” and reminded his colleagues that many gunboats carrying an equivalent amount
of artillery could be built for the cost of one frigate.360 Gunboat advocates reminded their
colleagues of the prior tactical success of gunboats in various navies around the world. Burwell
noted the recent use of gunboats against the British Navy by France, Spain, and the Netherlands,
and reported the gunboats had enjoyed tremendous success especially when used in concert with
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shore artillery.361 Jacob Crowninshield, Republican from Massachusetts, reminded his
colleagues the U.S. Navy used gunboats during operations against Tripoli, and found them very
effective in shallow, coastal waters. Crowninshield was so confident in gunboats, he “believed
that they could not at this time adopt a better mode of defence than that proposed by the bill.”362
John Smilie, Republican from Pennsylvania, historically not a friend of defense
appropriations or the Navy, nonetheless threw his support behind the gunboat bill. Like
Jefferson, Smilie feared building warships to defend American commerce abroad would draw the
United States into foreign wars; “He hoped,” he announced, “It never would be said that they
ought to defend themselves beyond their own shores.”363 Gunboats were acceptable, however,
because they were confined to coastal waters and harbors, and were strictly defensive measures.
Further, Smilie said gunboats could attack when they had tactical advantage and withdraw into
shallow water if faced by overwhelming force. While he confessed he was not a naval tactician,
he believed that since the President and the Secretary of the Navy had requested gunboats after
consideration of all the means at their disposal it was inappropriate for him to “pursue any
opinion of his own in contradiction to this, when he had no evidence on which to ground that
opinion.”364
After two weeks of debate the anti-gunboat faction proved no match for the pressure to
do something to ensure the security of the American coast; Virginia Republican Thomas
Newton, Jr. thought even the amount of debate on the topic excessive. “When our affairs were
thus situated,” he asked, “Ought they not to make a better use of their time and the public money,
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than in debating on the details of a bill?”365 “An Act to Appropriate Money for Providing an
Additional Number of Gunboats,” amended to appropriate $852,500 for one hundred eightyeight gunboats, was read in the House a third time on December 10, and passed with
overwhelming support (one hundred eleven in favor, only nineteen opposed) on December 12.366
With gunboats provided for, Blount moved to strike the second nearly identical section from his
own bill, which was amended to appropriate one million dollars for harbor fortifications.367 “An
Act for Fortifying the Ports and Harbors of the United States, and For Building Gun-Boats”
subsequently passed the House and Senate, and became effective January 8, 1808.368
The Tenth Congress passed the last gunboat appropriation during Jefferson’s
administration. In Jefferson’s final State of the Union message, delivered on November 8, 1808,
Jefferson announced the War Department’s progress on fortifications around major cities “as
seemed to be called for by the situation of the several places, their relative importance, and the
scale of expense indicated by the amount of the appropriation.”369 Jefferson also reported, while
he was authorized to build one hundred eighty-eight additional gunboats, only one hundred and
three had been completed which, “With those before possessed, are sufficient for the harbors and
waters most exposed.”370 His words were likely infuriating for Congressmen Masters, Durrell,
Gardner, and Cook, who had advocated for fewer gunboats.
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The Tenth Congress’s gunboat appropriation represented a dramatic departure from the
earlier appropriation debates in the Ninth Congress. Several key differences are obvious. First,
the Tenth Congress demonstrates the dramatic political unification national emergencies create.
Gunboats were so unpopular during the Ninth Congress’s second session no money was
appropriated for further construction. In contrast, the Tenth Congress appropriated $825,500 for
an additional one hundred eighty-eight boats less than a year later. The appropriation made in
December 1808 was more than twice as large as the combined gunboat appropriations made by
the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Congresses.
Second, the gunboat appropriation of the Tenth Congress showed northern Republican’s
influence had declined, or at least that northern Republicans were unable to compete with the
outrage caused by HMS Leopard’s attack. During previous congresses, northern Republicans
successfully blocked gunboat appropriations and provided steadily increasing sums of money for
harbor fortifications. In 1807-1808, despite the efforts of Masters, Durrell, Gardner, and Cook,
only nineteen congressmen voted against building additional gunboats, which allowed the
gunboat appropriation to pass with overwhelming House support.
Congress proved more unified than the public. The gunboat debate raged before the
public in print, and both sides published competing pamphlets and articles. William Duane, in
his 1807 essay Politics for American Farmers, argued against seagoing warships and wrote, “A
military naval force has been productive only of disaster to France, Holland, and Spain…and
what has it produced for England? Let its debts, its poor-houses, its prisons, and its declension
from civil liberty, declare it.”371 He appealed to Republicans to remember their children; “Are
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you farmers ready to send your sons on board the destructive den of disease, crimes, immorality,
and human debasement, called a man of war? O! God forbid!” (emphasis original).372
Others defended the Jefferson’s administration from Federalist ship owners from New
England, who charged the Republicans with apathy toward commerce. In an 1808 pamphlet
titled An Address to the People of New England, a writer who adopted the pen name “Algernon
Sidney” argued Jefferson’s gunboats proved his commitment to the merchants. While some
“objected that the gunboat system is not in aid of the commercial interest,” he believed instead
the gunboats were “increased for the double purpose of driving from our coasts and harbors
those licensed piccaroons, who have been principally instrumental in harassing and plundering
our commerce, and to protect our ports and harbors.”373 “Sidney” noted the Jefferson
administration spent more on naval defense than the Washington and Adams Administrations
combined. “[Out] of every thousand dollars expended,” he wrote, “Four hundred and forty
eight…for the navy and commerce.”374
In contrast, naval advocates were unimpressed. The lack of warships left American
commerce unprotected, and some suggested a respectable force of warships could be built for the
same cost as the gunboat fleet. An anonymous writer from South Carolina wrote in 1807 that
gunboats were a waste of scarce federal money in a pamphlet titled The Go-Between: Or Two
Edged Sword. With a hint of amused sarcasm he wrote the gunboats, which he called “The last
waste of public money,” reminded him “of a school of mullets attempting to repulse a school of
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sharks.”375 He added by his estimation, “The expense of building and supporting the boats…for
ten years, would completely fortify New-York.”376
After the Chesapeake was attacked, anti-gunboat literature escalated in intensity and was
not confined to prose. Thomas Green Fessenden’s derisive 1809 book Pills, Poetical, Political,
and Philosophical ridiculed Jefferson’s gunboats in verse:
They hang our vessels by the nape,
But let the wicked crew escape!!
Our private property abusing,
Sends gun boats into cornfields cruising377
Where doubtless every one of those
Will “do more harm” than fifty crows.
I’d sooner, in a field of mine,
Turn loose a herd of rampant swine,
Possess’d of devils, many a score,
Like those we read about of yore,
Than one of these amphibious creatures,
Feeble, yet noxious as mosquitos.378
Fessenden renewed his attack in a footnote, and bitingly added, “We would not insinuate
that a gun boat well manned and her single great gun loaded with mustard seed shot…would not
be competent to cope with all the mosquitos in the Jerseys.” Despite his joking manner,
Fessenden’s doubts about the defensive capabilities of the gunboats were very real. He
concluded gunboats would “be tolerable auxiliaries, but would be wretched principals, either for
defensive or offensive operations” (emphasis original).379 Others opposed gunboats with even
harsher language than Fessenden. In a stirring defense of New England commerce titled A
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Discourse, Delivered Before the Lieutenant Governor, David Osgood proclaimed in 1809, “The
gunboat policy…is so despicable and puerile that, were Buffon still alive, he might bring it as
another proof of the ‘dwarfish nature of every American production.’”380
Virginia planter and “Father of the Constitution” James Madison was elected President
following the end of Jefferson’s second term. In many ways, Madison’s election represented a
“stay-the-course strategy.”381 Madison did not share Jefferson’s enthusiasm for gunboats,
however. Madison biographer Drew McCoy argued that while Madison and Jefferson were both
true believers in the Republican process, Madison distrusted, “The disruptive and unsettling
effects of immediate popular influence…because in America, as elsewhere, the large body of the
people were not always or even ordinarily guided by enlightened vision.”382 McCoy attributed
Madison’s belief the underinformed public were not always right to his experience as a state
legislator. In contrast, Jefferson’s belief in participatory democracy above all was due to his
time spent in France, where he observed a powerful regime, “That magnified the evils of
monarchical despotism.”383 In short, Madison proved far less susceptible to the influence of
prominent Republican antinavalists like Macon, Randolph, and Smilie.
Even though Jefferson was no longer in office, commentators continued to critique the
gunboat plan. In 1810 another anonymous writer called “A Farmer,” this time from New Jersey,
wrote, “The gunboats, like air-balloons, are of too flimsy and fragile a nature for men of sense to
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trust their carcasses in.”384 Meanwhile, Massachusetts lawyer and Federalist John Lowell Jr.
blasted Jefferson and Madison in The New-England Patriot for decommissioning several frigates
even as they “stirred up a quarrel” with England. He blustered Republican ignorance and pride
was responsible for, “The inefficient system of gun boat defence,” and argued the program, “In
point of expense, vastly exceeded that of the regular and honorable system which was abolished
to make way for it.”385
Nonetheless while Madison did not build more gunboats, he did not build additional
warships either. Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg, historians of the Jefferson and Madison
administrations, noted, “Madison was less committed to the fifty-foot gunboats than Jefferson
had been,” but he did not seek “an economically sound, militarily effective naval strategy”
during the first half of his presidency.386 The United States and Great Britain drifted closer to
war, pushed by continued British attacks on the American commercial fleet and impressment of
American sailors. Madison was increasingly attacked by both Federalists and members of his
own party who believed “reliance on the expensive, lightly armed gunboats…made no sense at
all.”387
When war came in June 1812, the fleet of gunboats that Jefferson and his Republicans
had such faith in proved disappointing. Only sixty-two gunboats were in service, and many
others required extensive repairs before being fit to fight. Pro-navy advocates were dismayed.
In a July 4, 1812 speech titled An Oration, Pronounced at Hardwick, July 4th, 1812, Festus
Foster pessimistically claimed, “Mr. Jefferson’s accession to the presidency formed a new era in
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our political history” in which, “Our new philosophers considered a navy worse than useless.”388
Foster sarcastically continued, “The gunboat system…left Congress nothing to fear from an
invasion. European nations smiled at our folly and seized our defenseless commerce.”389 U.S.
strategy called for the gunboats to prevent British incursion into coastal waters. Tucker wrote
gunboats successfully prevented British warships from entering some harbors but noted, “The
Royal Navy was able to enter most coastal areas at will, especially the Chesapeake Bay.”390
Ultimately, it was the lack of coherent defense in the Chesapeake which allowed the British to
attack and burn Washington, D.C.
Gunboat historian Spencer C. Tucker admitted gunboat performance during the War of
1812 was generally frustrating. He suggested, however, “It must be remembered that [the
gunboats] in service were not usually employed as intended, [and] they provided valuable service
in transporting men, ordnance, and supplies…In addition, gunboats served as hospital vessels,
lighters, pilot vessels, places of confinement, and storeships.”391 In contrast, naval historian
Charles W. Goldsborough was less forgiving. He wrote, “The services rendered by the gun boats
were so inconsiderable…those who had in the first instance zealously advocated them, yielded
by degrees to the force of the arguments that were urged against them.”392
James Madison was one such individual, and the experience of the War of 1812 changed
his mind about Jefferson’s gunboats. Consequentially Madison’s administration pursued policy
in a cooperative Congress to phase the gunboats out of service. On March 20, 1812, “An Act
Concerning the Naval Establishment” was passed by the Twelfth Congress and Madison was,
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“Hereby authorized and empowered to cause to be immediately repaired, equipped and put into
actual service, the frigates Chesapeake, Constellation and Adams.”393 The U.S. Navy was
appropriated $212,000 per year for the purchase of enough timber to rebuild the frigates
Philadelphia, General Greene, New York, and Boston.394 Finally, Congress directed all gunboats
then in service to be decommissioned and distributed to at risk harbors for emergency use, “As
soon as it shall be deemed compatible with the good of the public service.”395
William Jones, appointed Secretary of the Navy in 1813, assisted Madison’s efforts. A
seaman and merchant from Philadelphia, Jones set out to reform the U.S. Navy. Jones was “a
man who despised gunboats,” and promptly decommissioned half of the fleet in accordance with
the previous year’s legislation.396 Immediately following the end of the War of 1812 and the
disappointing performance of the gunboats, Congress passed “An Act to Repeal Certain Acts
Concerning the Flotilla Service, and for Other Purposes” on February 27, 1815. Significantly,
Goldsborough noted, “The last act of Congress to be found upon this subject” provided for the
selling and discharge of all gunboats from U.S. Navy service.397 Madison was permitted, “To
cause to be sold…such and so many of the gunboats belonging to the United States, as in his
judgement may no longer be necessary to be retained for the public service.”398 By the end of
1815, Goldsborough recorded only a few in service as transports.
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Conclusion
The Gunboat Debate in Review

Jefferson did not invent gunboats. Gunboats were used with great success by both sides
during the American Revolution, especially in lake and riverine environments. Many other
countries used gunboats with great success, especially the Dutch, who used flotillas of gunboats
against British frigates during “The Gunboat War” between 1807-1814. While gunboats were
phased out of service during Madison’s administration, other gunboats would see action in
American service during later wars. Both the Confederate Navy and the U.S. Navy used small,
relatively lightly armed vessels called gunboats during the American Civil War, and “The Brown
Water Navy” operated on the jungle rivers of Vietnam.
The Jefferson administration was unique, however, because gunboats were made the
foundation of the United States’ coastal defense system, rather than as auxiliary vessels on rivers
or in coastal environments. Historians have grappled with Jefferson’s interest in gunboats since
the end of his administration. Many early historians, especially those with Federalist sympathies
like Henry Adams, James Fenimore Cooper, and the Sprouts accused Jefferson of perpetrating an
unrealistic naval strategy upon the United States, and argued the gunboat system of defense was
“unsuited” to the country’s coastal environment and personality of the American people. Others,
like Roosevelt and Mahan suggested Jefferson would not construct warships to defend the
country or its maritime commerce because he was a pacifist who placed his loyalty to peace
ahead of country. In their eyes, Jefferson was responsible for the United States’ humiliation by
the British during the War of 1812.
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The Jeffersonian experiment with gunboats illustrates several key points. In contrast to
Roosevelt et. al., more recent historians including Symonds, Smith, and Tucker showed
Jefferson’s program was more prudent than thought in the past, especially in light of the cost of
seagoing warships and the political situation in the United States at the time.
This thesis illustrates that Jefferson’s gunboat program was the product of political,
economic, and international constraints. While Jefferson was the leader of the Republican party
at the time and took a leading role in establishing policy, he could not disregard the desires of his
fellow Republicans. More conservative Republicans with anti-naval tendencies, including
Nathaniel Macon, Albert Gallatin, and John Randolph expressed their expectation that Jefferson
would reduce naval spending during his administration. Jefferson was committed to reducing the
size of the Federal debt and lowering or eliminating taxes, and had Jefferson ignored the desires
of his fellow Republicans and started an expensive warship construction program, he would have
lost the support of his party and Congress.
The international political situation of the day also influenced the gunboat program.
Great Britain was the prominent naval power of the day; any large-scale naval construction
program would be interpreted as a threat to British naval supremacy. Jefferson was aware of the
preemptive British attack on Copenhagen in 1801 after Britain’s naval superiority in the Baltic
Sea was challenged by an alliance of northern countries. In light of the domestic and
international political considerations of the day, Jefferson could not have constructed a
European-style navy of sea-going battleships without compromising the trust of the Republican
party, infringing on his own guiding principles, bankrupting the U.S. government, or invoking
the wrath of the most powerful navy on earth; in short, in Jefferson’s circumstances, gunboats
were his only naval option.
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Third, the gunboat program shows the Republican party during the Jeffersonian era was
not as anti-navy as traditionally depicted. Jefferson established policy, but Congress was
responsible for its funding and implementation. Few larger warships were constructed during
Jefferson’s administration, but the Republicans of the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Congresses passed three separate laws which appropriated in total $1,205,500 for gunboat
construction. American shipwrights built nearly one hundred eighty gunboats between 1802 and
1808. With the exception of the March 1807 gunboat appropriation bill, which failed in the
Senate, all passed with strong Republican support. These are hardly the actions of committed
antinavalists.
Fourth, while some historians have depicted Jefferson’s Republicans as southern planters
committed to agriculture and contemptuous of commerce, the gunboat debates were dominated
by northern Republicans, especially from Massachusetts, New York, and Maryland. The role of
Republicans from Maryland cannot be overstated, as Marylanders drafted most of the gunboat
legislation and navigated it through Congress. Many northern Republicans, and not a few
southerners as well, expressed their desire to protect maritime commerce and argued commercial
shipping and trade was an important source of revenue. The Northeastern Republican contingent
was so pro-navy and pro-commerce, many seem more closely aligned with Congressional
Federalists than traditional Republicans.
Finally, the large gunboat appropriation made by Republicans after the ChesapeakeLeopard affair demonstrated the unifying effect of national emergencies. Congressional
Republicans granted twice as much money for gunboat construction as all previous
appropriations combined and authorized one hundred and eight-eight additional gunboats, three
times as many as were owned by the U.S. Navy at the time.
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